Prostitution Should Be Legalized

Prostitution ought to be sanctioned Prostitution was assessed to go back to at any rate 2400 B. C, alongside specialist, recorder, stylist and cook (Little known realities in the prostitution banter, n. d. ). Regardless of this length of administration, whether sex industry ought to be sanctioned or not is as yet a dubious issue that sets aside a ton of effort to locate the best choice. As I would see it prostitution ought to be authorized for a superior prostitutes’ working condition, for a lower explicitly transmitted sicknesses rates and an improved intensity of governments toward this job.To start with, prostitution’s authorization with rules setting prostitutes’ rights and obligations will assist with giving them a superior working condition. In current circumstance, sex laborers are being treated in a subhuman manner. Suraya, a sex specialist was accounted for to have been beaten, compromise by a blade, assaulted commonly, taken all cash lastly tossed out o f the vehicle by her own client (Pauw and Brener,1998). Not exclusively be customers’ casualties, whores likewise are abused by their pimps.Kudlow (2006) found that â€Å"even however the young ladies bring home the money, commit no errors, the pimp gets all the cash. There is nothing of the sort as a commission, rate, cut, payoff, or dividend†. Also, as per Fighting sexual misuse and dealing in Indonesia (2004), in Indonesia, 33% of sex laborers are being underage young ladies. These young ladies have not grown up both physical part and mental part, yet they are cleared into this activity too soon, which can go them to a tragic end.These crude realities, which are requiring for a pressing activity from the administration, set an alert to wake us up. On the off chance that there is an official sanctioning alongside rules setting about prostitutes’ rights and obligations, the pimps will not, at this point have the option to constrain these sex laborers, these lab orers can get their pay reasonably and underage young ladies will be kept from entering this activity too soon. Also, prostitution’s legitimization with rules requiring intermittent wellbeing checks will assist with decreasing explicitly transmitted rates through this service.Sexually transmitted ailments, which are frequenting various contaminated individuals and their families, are all society’s intrigue. The sex industry’s authorization with a prerequisite to get to intermittent wellbeing checks is a keen strategy for this issue. Whores with explicitly transmitted rates will be discovered and rewarded in time, and furthermore the quantity of individuals coming down with ailments through prostitution will be decreased. Some third nations have increased a huge fall in explicitly transmitted rates along these lines, for example, Kenya and Senegal.After the prostitution’s sanctioning, the quantity of condoms utilized by sex laborers in Kenya had expanded t o over 80%. In Senegal, by unique clinical administrations, for example, offering customary assessments and medicines for enlisted whores, HIV pervasiveness among pregnant ladies had fallen into under 1% (Steen, as refered to in Liberator, 2005). Clearly, prostitution’s decriminalization with rules requiring occasional wellbeing checks is the most ideal approach to bring down STDs rates through prostitution just as improve the social health.Finally, present laws with its preclusion against selling sex have not concocted people’s desire. Everywhere in the United States, sex laborers and their clients are punished for what they did as consenting grown-ups. Be that as it may, in the wake of having paid the fines, sex laborers return to avenues with their work and no decline in the quantity of them has been accounted for. Additionally in this audit of legalization’s benefits, they included that â€Å"Making prostitution legitimate will permit the demonstration to b e overseen rather than ignored†.In option to this circumstance, present laws don't furnish whores with enough security. A whore murder admitted to have slaughtered an aggregate of forty eight sex laborers â€Å"because he realized he would not be held accountable† and it took police 20 years to distinguish his wrongdoing (Ditmore, 2007). A few people may contend that whores and their activity break the society’s ethical quality. This conclusion just spotlights on the value of the surface, thinking about whores as lawbreakers and scrutinizing them, not with respect to the way that they are additionally human, they likewise need to work inturn of money.According to a review (Lobert, n. d. ) named â€Å"What do you need† directed among whores, 78% need home and safe spots, 58% need medicinal services and 42% need legitimate help. These young ladies are living in a subhuman life, they are requiring every single essential need. In addition, prostitution will co nsistently exist since its serving significant capacity in social orders (Kingsley and Davis, as refered to in Kendall, 1998). Without customers’ request, prostitution would not, at this point have the option to proceed. Therefore, whores have the right to work under the laws’ patronage.In end, in view of the genuine circumstances, prostitution ought to be sanctioned. Alongside the sanctioning, there will be rules setting about permitted age, working condition and wellbeing check necessity. This legitimization not just realizes a superior working condition for those sex laborers, yet additionally adds to decrease explicitly transmitted sicknesses, and accordingly develop a superior world.References Kendall, D. E. (1998). Social issues in a differing society. Part 7, p. 136, p. 141. US. Kudlow, M. (2006). Selling sex. Recovered November 21, 2009, from http://thegauntlet. ca/story/10365 Liberator, M. (2005). Legitimized prostitution: Regulating the most seasoned calling. Recovered November 21, 2009 from http://deliverer. net/articles/prostitution. html Little known realities in the prostitution banter (n. d. ). Recovered November 21, 2009, from http://prostitution. procon. organization/see. asset. php? resourceID=000116 Lobert, A. (n. d. ). Prostitution measurements the genuine truth. Recovered November 21, 2009, from http://powerhouse-service. rg/annielobert_prostitution. aspx Pauw, I. and Brener, L. (1997). Naming the peril of taking a shot at the road, p. 80. Plan Feminist Media. Accessible online at http://www. jstor. organization/pss/4066227 Raymond, J. and Ditmore, M. (2007). Discussing legitimized prostitution. Recovered November 21, 2009, from http://humantrafficking. organization/refreshes/643 UNICEF (n. d. ). Battling sexual misuse and dealing in Indonesia. Recovered November 21, 2009, from http://www. unicef. organization/infobycountry/indonesia_23650. html Prostitution Should Be Legalized Prostitution ought to be authorized Prostitution was evaluated to go back to at any rate 2400 B. C, alongside specialist, copyist, hair stylist and cook (Little known realities in the prostitution banter, n. d. ). Regardless of this length of administration, whether sex industry ought to be legitimized or not is as yet a disputable issue that sets aside a great deal of effort to locate the best choice. As I would like to think prostitution ought to be legitimized for a superior prostitutes’ working condition, for a lower explicitly transmitted sicknesses rates and an improved intensity of governments toward this job.To start with, prostitution’s authorization with rules setting prostitutes’ rights and obligations will assist with furnishing them with a superior working condition. In current circumstance, sex laborers are being treated in a subhuman manner. Suraya, a sex specialist was accounted for to have been beaten, undermine by a blade, assaulted commonly, ta ken all cash lastly tossed out of the vehicle by her own client (Pauw and Brener,1998). Not exclusively be customers’ casualties, whores likewise are abused by their pimps.Kudlow (2006) found that â€Å"even however the young ladies bring home the money, commit no errors, the pimp gets all the cash. There is nothing of the sort as a commission, rate, cut, payoff, or dividend†. Besides, as indicated by Fighting sexual misuse and dealing in Indonesia (2004), in Indonesia, 33% of sex laborers are being underage young ladies. These young ladies have not grown up both physical part and mental part, yet they are cleared into this activity too soon, which can go them to a shocking end.These crude realities, which are requiring for an earnest activity from the administration, set an alert to wake us up. On the off chance that there is an official legitimization alongside rules setting about prostitutes’ rights and obligations, the pimps will not, at this point have the option to pressure these sex laborers, these laborers can get their compensation decently and underage young ladies will be kept from entering this activity too soon. Furthermore, prostitution’s legitimization with rules requiring occasional wellbeing checks will assist with diminishing explicitly transmitted rates through this service.Sexually transmitted sicknesses, which are frequenting various contaminated individuals and their families, are all society’s intrigue. The sex industry’s legitimization with a prerequisite to get to intermittent wellbeing checks is an astute technique for this issue. Whores with explicitly transmitted rates will be discovered and rewarded in time, and furthermore the quantity of individuals contracting illnesses through prostitution will be decreased. Some third nations have increased a noteworthy fall in explicitly transmitted rates along these lines, for example, Kenya and Senegal.After the prostitution’s legitimization, the quantity of condoms utilized by sex laborers in Kenya had expanded to over 80%. In Senegal, by unique clinical administrations, for example, offering customary assessments and medicines for enrolled whores, HIV pervasiveness among pregnant ladies had fallen into under 1% (Steen, as refered to in Liberator, 2005). Clearly, prostitution’s decriminalization with rules requiring occasional wellbeing checks is the most ideal approach to bring down STDs rates through prostitution just as improve the social health.Finally, present laws with its restriction against selling sex have not thought of people’s desire. Everywhere in the United States, sex laborers and their clients are punished for what they did as consenting grown-ups. How

Controversial Issues in Entertainment Paper Essay

Questionable Issues in Entertainment Paper - Essay Example Since conversations on such points are available to open the inquiries in regards to its ethicality are questionable. As per Kuypers (2002) â€Å"Controversial issues are news, and for news we look to the press. (p. 1). This article intends to examine the different issues and discussions encompassing the inclusion of dubious issues/news by the media. With the end goal of this examination, the ongoing exceptionally sensational photograph of a metro train hunkering down on a man who was pushed off the stage, distributed by the New York Post on first page is utilized. The exceptionally realistic portrayal started broad discussions and reactions denouncing the deceptive distribution of the picture, the abuse of the opportunity of press, and offending the poise of mankind. Nature of contention: On December 4, 2012 The New York Post distributed a photograph on its first page, incredibly titled Pushed on the metro track, this man is going to pass on. Damned (See Appendix Fig. 1) Immediate after the shocking distribution of the upsetting picture by the paper, wide-running discussions and reactions encompassing the morals in photojournalism and nobility of mankind started pouring in from all quarters of the general public. The reactions essentially scrutinized the picture taker's decision of activity even with misfortune. The plan of the picture taker, R. Umar Abbasi was addressed raising genuine worries over the episode, especially since he decided to catch and afterward offer the picture to New York Post, as opposed to do the undeniable †for example mediate and attempt to support the man. The inaction of the picture taker featured his obvious unresponsiveness towards the person in question, welcoming extreme reactions concerning his absence of judgment and gross infringement of human rights. The distribution of the photograph by the New York Post on the first page likewise called for discussions and reactions encompassing the obtrusive utilization of freedom of the press by the distribution. The news columnists and picture takers are limited by a severe code of morals and great direct which involves them to act judiciously towards an individual or gathering and cling to the guidelines of ethical quality and standards regularly credited to and merited by the humankind. As indicated by the National Press Photographers Association's Code of Ethics: Photographic and video and pictures can uncover incredible facts, uncover bad behavior and disregard, rouse expectation and understanding and interface individuals around the world through the language of visual comprehension. Photos can likewise cause incredible damage on the off chance that they are insensitively nosy or are controlled (NPPA (2012) Although the distribution of the photograph didn't in any capacity disregard the code of morals, it anyway crossed the line of human poise, particularly thinking about that the realistic picture was distributed on the first page. The photograph was uti lized since it was ‘newsworthy’, and such pictures/stunning news things rush to get the audience’s consideration, as is evident from the broad responses earned for the time being from all parts of society including columnists and residents the same. Not long after the distribution of the photograph by the New York Post, different papers and tabloids just as the TV media secured the episode with shifted responses on the issue. The greater part of the print and visual media censured the distribution of the realistic picture however kept on covering the story as an ever increasing number of recordings and pictures caught by

Think You Know What to Do Youve Already Lost the Game.

Think You Know What to Do Youve Already Lost the Game. My salsa partner raises his left hand. I wonder, what does it mean? Does he want me to do a right turn? Or turn in another direction? Will he drop his hand over my head for a neck drop? Is there some other option I haven’t thought of? As soon as I start asking these questions, I’ve pretty much lost the game. The game is to feel what there is to do. As one of my teachers coached, “Where I feel, I go.” If only it were so easy. My brain thinks it knows what my partner is going to do. When I first started dancing, a raised hand always meant a right turn. But now there are more options, and my brain’s predictions get me into trouble. My job is to stop anticipating and go with what is happening in the moment. Predicting the future can get us into trouble in our careers and in business as well. Especially because we’re often wrong. Example #1: Annual Reviews (or Where Our Brains Take Us) I have a friend with a past history of getting fired from several jobs. He has now been with the same organization for six years and has gotten bonuses and raises at most of his annual reviews. Nevertheless, this year, when his annual review came up, his “stinking thinking” told him that some challenging dynamics with his new supervisor would lead to his getting fired. There really was no possibility of his losing his job. But thoughts of getting fired are his brain’s right turn. He goes to those thoughts even when he has not been led there. We all have these “go-to” thoughts, and they are probably the hardest thing to control, especially after we have trained ourselves so well to think them! But changing these thoughts is probably the most impactful move we can make on the career “dance floor.” If we can wait for real information and direction before defaulting to our patterned thinking, we can avoid a lot of internal, and external, struggle. Example #2: Client Request I had a client (I’ll call him Tom) sent to me by a larger organization. A representative of that organization (I’ll call her Liz) called to say that Tom wanted a different format and tone in his resume. This was one of our early projects for the organization, before we had hit our stride and started consistently producing the type of executive resumes their clients love. My first instinct was to train the initial writer who worked with Tom on the formats and style that the client wants. But I did not know whether Tom would be open to that. The “lead’s” hand was raised â€" but was this a signal to turn? I asked Liz to connect with Tom and got further information that indicated we needed to change direction. A new writer was able to deliver exactly what Tom wanted. I took Liz’s direction and created a win for everyone involved. Example #3: Automation and Innovation It used to be that when you had to fill an order, you got a human to find the item and put it in a box. It used to be that when you wanted to get a shipment delivered, you had an employee get in a truck and drive it there. These things are changing. The companies that resist the true direction that things are going are not going to survive. Just because you’ve always done something the way you knew to do it doesn’t mean it’s going to keep working, or that the market wants you to do it that way, this time. And just because there’s an option to automate something does not mean it will be the most efficient or the best way. The lead’s hand is raised… but wait before you turn. What if You’re the Boss? As a supervisor or business owner, our job is to do the best we can to provide clear direction so that those who follow us don’t get the wrong idea â€" and so that they feel like we are partnering with them fully. It helps to remember that we are followers too â€" of our clients and customers. If we can all manage ourselves in our respective roles, we can truly wow people on the dance floor! How do you see these principles of “lead” and “follow” playing out in your career or business? Please share below! Save Save

Nonrenewable And Renewable Energy Nonrenewable Energy

To be able to do anything in the world today the use of energy comes in play. Driving your car, turning on lights, and even turning on the water to take a shower are all forms of energy we use daily. Some tasks we do daily can use different types of energy. The two different types of energy make the world go around. Without the significance of nonrenewable and renewable energy, the world would never be able to function. Though some energy such as nonrenewable energy can be harmful to the environment, it is still used every day. Renewable energy is a safer route because it does not hurt the environment but indeed can be more costly. Nonrenewable and renewable energy can do a lot with helping and hurting the environment. Nonrenewable is a type of energy that cannot renew itself. According to the U.S Energy Information Administration, different natural resources such as coal, oil, natural gas, and many others take thousands of years to form naturally. Nonrenewable resources are known to not be able to replace themselves as fast as the resources are consumed. According to the article â€Å"Non-renewable Energy† in the National Geographic website, millions of years ago before dinosaurs the earth had a total different landscape. The earth was covered with shallow seas and swampy forests. In the wet lands plant life was created. Algae and plankton absorbed sunlight and ended up creating energy through photosynthesis. After these plants would die their organisms would drift to theShow MoreRelatedRenewable Energy Through Feed On Tariffs And Taxes1263 Words   |  6 Pagesdebated on whether or not nonrenewable energy such as fossil fuel has caused global warming. Sakamoto and Managi (2016) believe f ossil fuel is the likely reason that temperatures have been rising from greenhouse gases, increasing the CO2 emissions (p. 1). 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Tbsc Compensator For Online Starting Of Induction Motors Business Essay - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 9 Words: 2712 Downloads: 9 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Business Essay Type Cause and effect essay Did you like this example? Abstract This paper presents a topology for direct online starting of Induction Motors (I.M.s) using Thyristor Binary Switched Capacitor (TBSC) compensator operating in closed loop. TBSC is based on a chain of Thyristor Switched Capacitor (TSC) banks arranged in binary sequential manner. A transient free switching of TBSCs is carried out. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Tbsc Compensator For Online Starting Of Induction Motors Business Essay" essay for you Create order Proposed topology allows switching in/out of capacitor banks according to the reactive power requirement of induction motors in very fast responding closed loop. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can achieve reactive power compensation in cycle to cycle basis. Proposed scheme can be used for direct online starting of I.M.s with voltage sag mitigation at starting, which helps improving stability of the system and Power Factor (P.F.) improvement in steady state. Keywords Reactive power compensation, TBSC, transient free switching, voltage sag, Power Factor Introduction Induction motors (I.M.) constitute a large portion of power system. Three-phase induction motors represent the most significant load in the industrial plants, over the half of the delivered electrical energy [1]. Starting of induction motor may cause a problem of voltage sag in the power system. The IEEE defines voltage sag as: A decrease to between 0.1 and 0.9 p.u. in rms voltage or current at the power frequency for durations of 0.5 cycle to 1 min [2]. An induction motor at rest can be modeled as a transformer with the secondary winding short circuited. Thus when full voltage is applied, a heavy inrush current (of 6 to 10 times the rated value) is drawn from the power system that causes voltage sag. As the motor accelerates and attains the rated speed, the inrush current decays and the system voltage recovers [3]. Voltage sag can cause mal-operation of voltage sensitive devices such as computers, relays, programmable logic controllers etc. [chetan]. Also because of the highly ind uctive nature of the motor circuit at rest, the power factor is very low, usually of the order of 10 to 20 percent [3]. Thus reactive power demand at the starting of I.M. is very high and it reduces as motor picks up the speed. There are several solutions to minimize this problem, the most common are [5]: reactor start, auto transformer start, delta-wye start, capacitor start, soft starter, frequency variable driver (FVD) etc. All these methods except capacitor start are based on a motor terminal voltage reduction to decrease the rotor current, reducing the line voltage drop [5]. Problem with this method of starting is that the motor torque is directly proportional to the square of the supply voltage hence decrease in the motor terminal voltage will cause the motor torque to decrease, which may be insufficient for driving the required load [6]. Soft starter and frequency variable driver methods are the most expensive and complex, requiring more expert maintenance [7]. In capacitor s tart system, reactive current required by the motor during acceleration is supplied by capacitors which reduce the source current. This in turn reduces the magnitude of voltage sag in the system. Capacitor start method has a lower cost in comparison with other methods however one has to consider the transitory effects of switching of capacitor banks [3]. An alternative solution without motor terminal voltage reduction was proposed using Static VAR Compensator (SVC) in [8]. In [9] different topology of SVC without using thyristor controlled reactor (TCR) was proposed which has advantage of reduction in both cost as well as harmonics produced by TCR. This paper presents a simple topology, which is shown in Fig.1. TBSC Compensator Induction Motor n Induction Motor 2 Vs Induction Motor 1E:M.Tech DissertationSmart DrawNewI.MIMMain-Diagram.tif Fig. 1 Proposed topology. C.T. Current Transformer P.T. Potential Transformer TBSC Thyristor Binary Switched Capacitor C Capacitor Value Distribution Transformer Point Of Common Coupling (PCC) C.T. P.T. 27 C 22 C 21 C 20 C I CONTROLLER 8 TBSC Banks V Induction MotorsE:M.Tech DissertationSmart DrawNewController_I.M.tif Fig.2 TBSC compensator for direct online starting of induction motor. The proposed scheme consists of Thyristor Switched Capacitor (TSC) banks in binary sequential steps [9] known as Thyristor Binary Switched Capacitor (TBSC) which are used for direct online starting of induction motor. The proposed topology has following distinctive features: 1) Transient free switching of capacitors is carried out. 2) Reactive power compensation is achieved in cycle by cycle basis. 3) Low cost 4) Closed loop operation is achieved using controller 5) Can be used to start more than one induction motor. 6) Can be implemented at the Point of common coupling (PCC) without disturbing the existing starting techniques. The theme of this paper deals with the proposed topology, description of controller and presentation of simulation results. Proposed Topology Description TBSC compensator connected at the point of common coupling (PCC) for direct online starting of induction motors is shown in Fig.2. The operating principle of TBSC and controller is outlined in the following sections. TBSC TBSC consists of an anti-parallel connected thyristor and diode as a bidirectional switch in series with a capacitor and a current limiting small reactor. Transient free switching of capacitors is obtained by satisfying following two conditions [10]: Firing the thyristors at the negative/positive peak of supply voltage Precharging the Capacitors to the negative/positive peak of supply voltage TSC current is sinusoidal and free from harmonics, thus eliminating the need for any filters. Small-series inductor is placed in series with capacitor. It serves following purposes [11]: It limits current transients if capacitors are switched at inappropriate instants. The chosen inductor magnitude gives a natural resonant frequency of many times the system nominal frequency. This ensures that the inductance neither creates a harmonic resonant circuit with the network nor affects the TSC control system. In the proposed scheme capacitor bank step values are chosen in bin ary sequence weights to make the resolution small. If such n capacitor steps are used then 2n different compensation levels can be provided [12]. In this paper eight TBSC banks are arranged as 2.5: 5: 10: 20: 40: 80: 160: 320 KVAR in star connected with neutral grounded configuration. CONTROLLER Controller is the heart of compensator. Voltage V and current I at PCC are sensed by Potential Transformer (P.T.) and Current Transformer (C.T.) respectively and given to controller. Controller determines the value of reactive power required to achieve the desired power factor and then generates the control signals (gate signals) which are given to TBSC banks. Controller Description Reactive Power demand of I.M.s QMotor Transient Free Switching QTBSC QActual PI Controller _ Q Sensing + QRef _ + TBSC Banks ADCC:UsersIrfanAppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsTemporary Internet FilesContent.WordClosed Loop_TSC2.tif Fig. 3 TBSC closed loop operation. A block diagram of TBSC compensator operating in closed loop is shown in Fig. 3. Reference reactive power, QRef is calculated from the desired power factor (If unity power factor is required then Qref will be set to zero). Actual reactive power at PCC, QActual depends on the number of motors switched in the system. QActual is calculated by sensing voltage and current at PCC by P.T. and C.T. respectively. Error signal between QRef and QActual is given to PI controller. Discrete PI controller is used. Output of PI controller is given to ADC and its output is given to TBSC banks in such a way that no transients occur. Switching in/out of capacitor banks is decided by the controller. At the time of starting of I.M.s reactive power demand is large hence higher capacitor banks will be switched in while as motor reaches the rated spe ed only few lower capacitor banks will remain connected at the PCC. In this way closed loop operation of TBSC banks for direct online starting of I.M.s is achieved. Simulation Results MATLAB/SIMULINK software is used for simulation. Data used in the simulation is shown below. Source Voltage V = 400 V, Rs = 0.0287ÃÆ' ¢Ãƒ ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ¦, Ls = 0.20471mH Induction motor (I.M.) 3 identical I.M.s are used in the simulation which are switched on at t = 0 sec, 0.8 sec and 1.6 sec respectively. For Simulation purpose at 1.6 sec, two 50 h.p. motors are switched on simultaneously to get 100 h.p. load. Parameters of each I.M. are shown in Table I. TABLE I. Parameters Of Induction Motor Sr. No. Parameter Values 1. Voltage (line-line) 400 V 2. Frequency 50 Hz 3. Nominal power 50 h.p. 4. Speed 1480 r.p.m. TABLE II. Values Of Eight Tbsc Banks Sr. No. Q (in KVAR) C (in  µF) L (in mH) 1. 2.5 50 0.10775 2. 5 100 0.0538 3. 10 200 0.0269 4. 20 400 0.0134 5. 40 800 0.0067 6. 80 1600 0.0033 7. 160 3200 0.0016 8. 320 6400 0.00084 TBSC banks Eight TBSC banks are used in the simulation whose values are shown in Table II. Direct online induction motor starting without TBSC compensator Fig. 4 shows the waveform of motor line voltage. When I.M.1 is switched on at t=0sec, the motor line voltage drops to 351V i.e. voltage sag of 11.14% takes place. Line voltage returns to steady value of 395V in 0.5sec. When I.M.2 is switched on at t=0.8sec, the motor line voltage drops to 349V i.e. voltage sag of 11.64% takes place. Line voltage returns to steady value of 392V in 0.5sec. When I.M.3 is switched on at t=1.6sec, the motor line voltage drops to 309V i.e. voltage sag of 21.77% takes place. Line voltage returns to steady value of 382V in 0.7sec. E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewVs_WithoutTBSC.tif Fig. 4 Motor line voltage without TBSC compensator. E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewQ_Without.tif Fig.5 Reactive power variation of I.M. without TBSC compensator. C:UsersIrfanAppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsTemporary Internet FilesContent.WordI_Without.tif Fig.6 Motor line current without TBSC compensator. C:Use rsIrfanAppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsTemporary Internet FilesContent.WordN_Without1.tif Fig.7 Speed of motors without TBSC compensator. Fig. 5 shows the variation of reactive power with time. When I.M.1 and 2 is switched on at t= 0sec and 0.8sec respectively, reactive power demand is around 250 KVAR at starting period. Reactive power demand is around 380 KVAR when I.M.3 is switched on at t=1.6 sec. It is seen that reactive power demand is very high at the time of starting of motor and it reduces as the motor reaches the steady state condition. Because of high reactive power requirement at start voltage drops as shown in Fig. 4. Fig. 6 shows the variation of motor current with time. When I.M.1 and 2 is switched on at t= 0sec and 0.8 sec respectively, current is around 500 A at starting period while at the time of starting of I.M. 3 it is around 1000 A. It is seen that when motor is switched on, current is very large at the starting period and it reduces as motor attains steady speed. Fig. 7 shows the variation of motor speed with time. When I.M.1 is switched on at t= 0sec it achieves rated speed in 0.6 sec. I.M.2 is switched on at t=0.8 sec and it achieves rated speed in 0.6 sec. At the time of switching of I.M.2 speed of I.M.1 drops to 1460 rpm for very short duration of about one cycle. I.M.3 is switched on at t=1.6 sec and it achieves rated speed in 0.8 sec. At the time of switching of I.M.3 speed of I.M.1 and I.M.2 drops to 1442 rpm for very short duration of about one cycle. Direct online induction motor starting with TBSC compensator Discrete PI controller with KP = 0.54 and KI = 25 and 8 bit ADC is used in simulation. Waveforms of I.M. reactive power demand QMotor and reactive power given by TBSC QTBSC are shown in Fig. 8. From simulation results it is seen that QTBSC closely follows QMotor and actual reactive power QActual at PCC is approximately zero at all times. Thus power factor is maintained near unity at all time. The small error is due to the binary switching arrangement of TSCs. Fig. 9 shows the motor line voltage with TBSC compensator. When I.M.1 is switched on at t=0sec, motor line voltage drops to 389V i.e. small voltage sag of 2.01% takes place for a duration of 0.4sec. Line voltage returns to steady value of 400V in 0.4sec. When I.M.2 is switched on at t=0.8sec, the motor line voltage drops to 377V i.e. voltage sag of 5.3% takes place for a duration of 0.4 sec. Line voltage returns to E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewQ_New_IM.tif Fig.8 Waveforms of QMotor and QTB SC. E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewVs_WithTBSC.tif Fig. 9 Motor line voltage with TBSC compensator. steady value of 396V in 0.4sec. When I.M.3 is switched on at t=1.6sec, the motor line voltage drops to 360V i.e. voltage sag of 7.92% takes place for a duration of 0.65 sec. Line voltage returns to steady value of 391V in 0.7sec. These results show that with TBSC compensator there is considerable reduction in voltage sag and there is improvement in the voltage profile. Fig. 10 shows the comparison of motor line voltage with and without TBSC compensator. Current waveforms through all TSC banks and total compensating current (of R phase) are shown in Fig. 11 which are free from harmonics and have negligibly small transients only at few switching instants. E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewVs_WithoutTBSC.tif E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewVs_WithTBSC.tif Fig. 10 Motor line voltage wit hout TBSC compensator (Top) and with TBSC compensator (Bottom). C:UsersIrfanAppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsTemporary Internet FilesContent.WordI_All_TSC1.tif C:UsersIrfanAppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsTemporary Internet FilesContent.WordI_All_TSC2.tif Fig. 11 Current waveforms through all TSC banks and total compensating current (of R phase only). E:M.Tech DissertationMATLABM-FilesMatlab figureI.MI.M. NewIs_Ic_Im.tif Fig. 12 Simulation results showing waveforms of motor current, total compensating current and source current in A (of R phase only). C:UsersIrfanAppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsTemporary Internet FilesContent.WordN.TIF Fig.13 Simulation results showing speed of Motors with TBSC compensator. Fig. 12 shows the waveforms of motor current, total compensating current and source current. From these results it is clear that the total compensating current i.e. current flowing through all TBSC banks is almost equal to the motor current. Source current at the instan t of switching of I.M.1 and I.M.2 (i.e. at t=0 sec and t= 0.8 sec) is around 300 A. While at the instant of switching of I.M.3 is around 700 A. These results show that with TBSC compensator there is considerable reduction in source current magnitude. This leads to reduction in voltage sag as shown in Fig. 10. Fig. 13 shows the variation of motor speed with time. When I.M.1 is switched on at t=0sec it achieves rated speed in 0.5 sec. I.M.2 is switched on at t=0.8 sec and it achieves rated speed in 0.5 sec. At the time of switching of I.M.2 speed of I.M.1 drops to 1460 rpm for v ery short duration of about one cycle. I.M.3 is switched on at t=1.6 sec and it achieves rated speed in 0.6 sec. At the time of switching of I.M.3 speed of I.M.1 and I.M.2 drops to 1442 rpm for very short duration of about one cycle. Comparisons of results with and without TBSC Compensator are shown in Table III. TABLE III. Comparison Of Results With and Without TBSC Compensator Sr. No. Parameter Without TBSC Compensator With TBSC Compensator I.M.1 (50 h.p.) I.M.2 (50 h.p.) I.M.3 (100 h.p.) I.M.1 (50 h.p.) I.M.2 (50 h.p.) I.M.3 (100 h.p.) 1 Switching instant (in sec) 0.0 0.8 1.6 0.0 0.8 1.6 2 % Voltage sag 11.14 11.64 21.77 2.01 5.3 7.92 3 Reactive power at starting (in KVAR) 250 250 380 Closely matches with the required value 4 Starting current (in A) 500 500 1000 300 300 700 Conclusion A topology for direct online starting of induction motors using TBSC compensator was presented. TSC bank step values were chosen in binary sequence weights to make the resolution small in order to achieve almost stepless reactive power compensation. Harmonic contents in source current were negligibly small. With the use of TBSC compensator; voltage sag magnitude gets reduced as well as voltage profile was improved. Controller operates in a closed loop to determine the number of capacitor units to be switched in the system. At the time of starting of I.M.s higher capacitor banks were switched in the system while once the motor reaches the rated speed only few lower capacitor banks will remain connected at the PCC. Thus at all times power factor was maintained near unity. The proposed scheme is effective during both steady state and transient conditions. Separate starting method for individual induction motors can be avoided and many motors can be started direct online using the prop osed scheme as long as TBSC banks are capable of supplying the required reactive power demand.

Business Impact Analysis Asset Identification And...

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Raver Subculture free essay sample

Over the past few years, an interesting focus has developed among our youth subculture in American society today. I have been interested in how the rave subculture has come into existence, and how they are able to maintain their unanimity and cohesiveness. This subculture mainly consists of people who go to raves, also known as, underground dance parties where people go to hear techno (electronically produced) music and have intense experiences, which they feel are self-transforming.The raves use an emotionally laden jargon to attempt to explain the intensity of their experiences to the unconverted. I felt that by researching the rave succubus True could come to a conclusion as to why raves are choosing to use ecstasy as their choice of drug and the effects of it. There has been a great deal of research into how the rave subculture came into being from organization around music, to drugs, and countercultures norms and deviant practices in society. While there have been efforts to look at the interrelations between language, culture, and identity, most of this research in these areas has not looked into the process of language formation and the ways in which existing engages are altered to fit new constantly changing roles, perceptions, and identities. However, my research will put emphasize on how in this subculture there is a constant presence of innovation and experimentation involved in language as well as, the illegal use of ecstasy. I will also focus on how the use of ecstasy is shifting the direction of social change. (Discuss 2 Articles-Astor) In the U. S. The subculture has been branded by the mainstream media and law enforcement agencies as a purely drug-centric culture similar to the hippies of the sass. As a result, suspect that raves will be effectively run out of business in many areas in the years to come. Furthermore, the rave subculture is aware that in rejecting existing linguistic practices, they are also challenging the norms and worldviews that they are suppose to.Linguistic innovation is a way of testing pathways of development for linguistic systems, attempting to find vectors which may meet future cultural demands and point to new directions of social change. To accurately asses this subculture will be using participant and observation methods. I started my research by owning out to a rave, with a well known DC playing, at Light Lounge. The night started late at around 1 1 :Pop. M. Enjoyed a few drinks while I was observing how raves interact with one another. The first thing I noticed is how this subculture dressed in bright colored child-like clothing.Raves use pacifiers in their mouth to fight off the sensation given to them by taking the drug ecstasy. Light shows intensify how the raves interact with one another, allowing them to hit the dance floor and express themselves by dancing with others. Raves that I spoke with at the club said they liked techno music more cause it lets your mind fill in the blanks. Raves also claimed that when they danced in large groups, listening to techno, taking EXT, they were able to see the true meanings behind the music through intense synthetic experiences.In turn, it created a separate stimulation in conjunction with the visual displays (lasers, holograms, strobes, videos, etc. ) at rave. The raves felt that the music has a deep psychological and emotional impact on the listener, and that each of the different kinds of techno resonates with different aspects of a persons being. Ambient is cerebral, aimed at the mind, hardcore techno is kinetic and aimed at the feet, compared to club and jungle music being instead more soulful, aimed at the spirit. Although, much of the rave jargon revolves around identifying the various subgroups found at rave parties (zippiest and Goths) and the submerges of techno music, as well as code words revolving around rolling or the use of Exotic or MADAM and other drugs at raves. But more importantly, observed raves language revolving around artfully crafted slangs to describe the sublime emotional tutus raves feel they experience at raves. Raving, after all, is the way most people refer to as forms of exhilarated, uncontrolled, modes of speech found in fanatics of all forms.However, the raves demonstrate that this is how the rave party makes them feel by dancing all night long. Claiming that Ordinary language is far too impoverished, rave talk uses a series of imaginative adjectives and nouns referring to things that the outsider couldnt possibly comprehend. Raves talk about each person having a unique vibration or frequency that is transformed by the music, and how roofs of people gather in synch ronous dance forms a self-iterative fractal of harmonious motion.The rave is supposed to take people of all races, colors, and nationalities and unite them into a consciousness synchronized around the pulsating rhythm of techno music. However, rave music is said to be able to breakdown boundaries and those of self-limitation, and of alienation from others. Most importantly, raves constantly are at work innovating new elements of language for creating a subcultures identity at Odds with dominant self-images and norms.What I have been trying to emphasize throughout this paper is the fact that, just as a certain element of creativity and artifice might be involved in a techno song, there is an element of playfulness and experimentation in the design of language among youth. New subcultures jargon dont just appear out of the unconscious without prompting the earlier youth subculture. To these appropriations, there is a constant process of innovation, in which people are adding terms out of a need to describe their feelings within their subculture sentiments, behaviors, and fluctuating identities.The subcultures jargon dont exist merely to alienate the outsider, they are there to be able to explore and probe new possi bilities and options for the larger mainstream culture as a whole. Furthermore, this causes social change in its entirety. People are self-aware of their own languages, and what they may see as its limitations or insufficiencies, depending on their self-concept. The subcultures jargon is a linguistic laboratory because inevitably subcultures terms are filtering out to the culture at large and in a sense shape the worldview and perceptions of societies.

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The Sale of Goods Act Essay Example

The Sale of Goods Act Essay Example The Sale of Goods Act Essay The Sale of Goods Act Essay This legislation affects Morrisons because now they cannot have misleading advertising, falsely accepting payment without intending to supply the goods, dual pricing, etc. So if Morrisons were found breaching this law they could be sued or taken to court. One advantage of this legislation is that it protects the customers from being mislead. However, a disadvantage of this legislation is that Morrisons will have to be more cautious about selling products to customers by making sure that they do not infringe the law. So in order for Morrisons to comply with the law they have to make sure Morrisons have all its products the kite mark and make sure all its products are checked at the high standards. However, Morrisons needs to employ more workers in order to make sure the products are up to the high standards and have kite mark. I personally believe that Morrisons should find a cheap way of making the products have high quality so that it complies with the law.The Sale of Goods Act, 1994 acts gives consumers protection against faulty or unreliable goods. At the time of sale, goods must be as described, of satisfactory quality and fit for the purpose for which they were bought. If a product is faulty at the time of sale or shortly afterwards, the customer has a right to reject the product and claim a refund. This legislation affects Morrisons because they have to make sure that they dont sell any faulty products to customers and if they accidentally do then they have to give refunds to the customers otherwise they will be violating the law. If they were found doing his they will be sued or taken to court.One advantage of this law is that it protects the customers from being given faulty products. However, this legislation costs money to Morrisons because they have to refund customers when ever the products they sell to the customers are faulty, some customers can damage the product on purpose just to get the refunds, so Morrisons are losing out. So Morrisons will have to change some of its processes, so Morrisons need to do make sure all its product complies to the high standards. One thing Morrisons could do is to employ a person whose job is to make sure none of the products are faulty as by doing this will save them money from giving refunds for example. However, they would have to pay for his/her wages, then again Morrisons could just train their current staff to do that job, again training will cost money.The children and young persons (protection from tobacco) 1991 act prohibits the sale of tobacco to children. This legislation affects my business because Morrisons sells cigarettes so it law implies that Morrisons should not sell cigarettes to children under the legal limit. So if Morrisons were found selling tobacco to under 16s then they are breaking the law so they could be taken to court. One advantage of this legislation is that it benefits the society as less people smoke. However, a disadvantage of this legislation is that Morrisons have to be careful when deciding who are under the legal limit age and who can buy the cigarettes, so this legislation would lose customers for Morrisons.I am going to look at the data protection acts such as data protection act 1998, freedom of information act 2000, environmental information re gulation 2004 and piracy and electronic communication (EC directive) regulations 2003 which affects me.Data Protection Act 1998 is the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. This data affects Morrisons because Morrisons have to be careful that they dont break the law by leaking personal information about customers for example, when they buy through the internet. So Morrisons could protect customer information in a database for example to make the personal information more secure, and only to access the personal information to contact them in emergency or discuss any offers they would like. Morrisons are not allowed to give customer information to other businesses in any circumstances. Morrisons also have to make sure that they do not keep the personal information of customers longer than necessary.I personally believe the best approach Morrison can take in this situation is store the information they got from t he customers in a secure database for roughly one month, and during that month they finish all the necessary procedures in delivering the product to the customer and offering them any new deals. Also they should delete the information of the customers after the month to prevent customers information being spread around other people.Freedom of information Act 2000 is to make provision for the disclosure of information held by public authorities or by persons providing services for them. This act affects Morrisons because if the public requests certain information about Morrisons for example about their chairmans report, Morrisons have to provide them with that information. However, if Morrisons were found breaching the law they could be taken to court. Morrisons have to ensure they only give the relevant information what the customers want. I personally believe the best approach to this law is to regularly publish information regarding Morrisons such as its sales, growth, its financi al information, etc. in a yearly booklet. This will reduce number of customers coming to store and regularly asking information regarding Morrisons. Also Morrisons should publish their sales, growth, its financial information, etc on their own website as it is much cheaper way, so they will be minimising their costs such as printing lots of booklets each year.Environmental information regulation 2004 is the change means that you can fulfil your right to be informed about the environment, so that you will be able to participate effectively in environmental decision-making; and have access to justice in law with regard to public decisions that have been made. This regulation affects Morrisons because Morrison has to give information if the public asks about the any activities Morrisons does which affects the environment. If Morrisons break this law they will be taken to court. I believe that Morrisons should publish the activities it does regarding helping environment such as recyclab le bags, recyclable bottles, etc. in their yearly booklet or even on their website. Morrisons should advertise more environmental helping procedures they do more regularly to stop people like pressure groups of their back and making them stand out as an environmental friendly company.Piracy and Electronic Communication (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 is the law establishes new rules for e-mail marketing, to reduce amount of unsolicited e-mail. This law affects Morrisons so Morrisons cannot send e-mail to customers regarding sales for example; they have to limit the number of e-mails they send out to customers, unless they will be breaching the law. I personally believe Morrisons can send emails roughly 3 emails per customer during Christmas period for example as it will be most effective and also reduce amount of so called junk email to customers.Now I am going to look at several employment legislations which affect my business like national minimum wage, employment act, dispute res olution, etc. The current National Minimum Wage for employees over 21 is à ¯Ã‚ ¿Ã‚ ½5.05 per hour. The current National Minimum Wage for 18 to 21 year olds is à ¯Ã‚ ¿Ã‚ ½4.25 per hour. A new rate for 16 and 17 year olds of à ¯Ã‚ ¿Ã‚ ½3 per hour was introduced in October 2004.

Music During Renaissance And Reformation Periods Essay

Music During Renaissance And Reformation Periods - Essay Example The English Renaissance is considered to extend from the early sixteenth to the early seventeenth century, and refers to a cultural and artistic movement in England. The Reformation is a period that overlaps with that of the renaissance. The English Reformation started in the reign of Henry VIII. (1509 – 1547 A.D.) with England breaking away from the Roman Catholic Church based in Rome. This was brought about by Henry VIII, who insisted on divorcing his first wife, Catharine of Aragon, who could not bear him a male heir, to marry Anne Boleyn. Divorce was not permitted by the Church, due to which the king took this extreme measure, of taking the church’s power as well on himself. His subjects were also not happy with the church’s clergy and priests, who were fraudulent. The Pope’s power was ended, and Henry VIII became the the Supreme Head of the Church in 1534, and the country continued to be Catholic.

Health South Corporation Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Health South Corporation - Case Study Example d risks associated with buying various businesses from HealthSouth and deciding whether it would be prudent of White Rock Capital to make such an investment. Of particular interest is the ambulatory surgery division, diagnostic centers and rehabilitation facilities earmarked for disposal. He is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the fraud case and the repurcusions of fraud. The cases under investigation involve fraud allegations against Healthsouth. In particular, Healthsouth is alleged to have billed group therapy as concurrent therapy. The concurrent therapy system was later (2002) abolished by the CMS upon the issue of a clarification requiring that all concurrent therapy services be reimbursed at group therapy rates. This policy change by the CMS was important to Healthsouth’s business interests as the concurrent therapy program generated more capital than the group therapy program. For eample, Healthsouth lowered its EBITDA by $172 million in the fiscal year 2002 as a result of changes in medicare reimbursements for its outpatient rehabilitation services. It is important for Nair to thoroughly scrutinise the suspect transactions carried out by Scrushy. One suspicious transaction is Scrushy’s decision to sell $74 million of his stock in may 2002 despite having previously announced satisfaction with analyst’s estimates of 39% grofit growth in early 2002. Another suspect transaction was Scrushy’s sale of shares in July 2002 to repay an outstanding loan he owed the company before the company’s profit warning. Despite the transaction being approved by the company’s Compensation Committee the shares of Health South tumbled 44% on august 27 2002 closing at $6.69 per share (Ferrell, Fraedrich and Ferrell, 2013). Nair should also note that the initiative by Healthsouth to spin-off its ambulatory surgery division and the shedding of other assets was in the aftermath of a SEC request for documents. There was concern among analysts that

Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms

Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms and the Market Reaction to Them Abstract We study the disclosure incentives for family firms by examining the characteristics of their quarterly earnings forecasts and analysts and investors responses to them. Forecasts offered before the fiscal quarter-end (guidance) by SP 500 family firms are generally more specific and timely than those offered by SP 500 non-family firms, particularly when they convey bad news or confirm analysts current expectations. Further, family firm guidance elicits a stronger response from both analysts and investors. While many of these differences largely disappear when the forecasts are offered after the quarter-end but before the earnings announcement itself (preannouncements), family firm preannouncements still tend to be more specific when they contain bad news. These more specific preannouncements also generate a significantly stronger response from analysts. Overall, our results suggest that large, visible family firms use manager-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transparent i nformation environment, and that these forecasts are likely to be most useful in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs when they are issued as guidance. Key Words: Management earnings forecasts, family firms, preannouncements, earnings warnings. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources listed in the text. Introduction. Family firms are generally defined as companies that are significantly influenced by founding family members or their descendants, through large shareholdings and/or operational control.[1] Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) report that family members hold approximately 18% of the equity of the family firms in the SP 500, on average, and control 45% of the CEO positions. In addition, family members often hold seats on the board of directors or are part of upper-level management in these firms (â€Å"Family Inc.†, Business Week, November 10, 2003). The structure inherent in these family firms gives rise to different agency problems than those in firms with much greater separation of ownership and control. Specifically, the family firm structure significantly limits the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control (often referred to as Type I agency problems) while exacerbating those that arise in the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (often referred to as Type II agency problems, see Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang 2006 and Anderson and Reeb 2003a). It is well known that the second type of agency problem can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure. However, it is also possible that reputational concerns may arise from the long-term nature of family members investment in their firm, mitigating this problem and reducing the need for more frequent and transparent disclosure (Wang 2006). The purpose of this paper is to add to our understanding of these competing incentives for differential disclosure by examining the characteristics of quarterly earnings forecasts issued by the management of family firms and the response of sell-side analysts and investors to them. Recent accounting research that examines mandatory financial disclosures by family firms suggests that reputational concerns alone may not be sufficient: Characteristics of family firms mandatory financial reports are consistent with their being used to mitigate the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) show that large family firms offer higher quality financial reports as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, greater ability of earnings to predict cash flows and larger earnings response coefficients. In addition, Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms in the SP 500 are more likely to voluntarily issue earnings forec asts during periods of earnings declines. However, they also find that family firms are less forthcoming in their disclosures about corporate governance. In a paper that was written concurrently with ours, Chen et al. (2007) study the frequency of voluntary disclosures (earnings and non-earnings forecasts and conference calls) from a larger sample of firms that includes the SP 500, SP MidCap 400 and SP SmallCap 600 in the five years before the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). They also find that family firms are more likely to issue bad-news earnings warnings but overall make fewer forward-looking disclosures than non-family firms, and conclude that their results are consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon and better monitoring of management, characteristics that obviate the need for greater disclosure. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the disclosures of family firms by studying one of the most informative and common types of voluntary financial disclosures—the companys own forecasts of its quarterly earnings per share—and sell-side analysts and investors responses to them. More specifically, we examine the characteristics of these disclosures (forecast specificity, surprise and accuracy), and the impact they have on important market indicators—professional analysts earnings estimates and stock prices. Thus, our analysis is designed to provide additional evidence on the relation between ownership structure and the quality of the firms information environment and, in particular, complements the existing empirical evidence on the characteristics and informativenesss of mandatory financial disclosures made by family and non-family firms (Ali et al. 2007 and Wang 2006). As noted above, we focus on a particular type of voluntary disclosure, managements forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and do so for two reasons. First, prior research indicates that these forecasts are highly value-relevant—and more value-relevant than management forecasts of annual earnings per share (Pownall et al. 1993, Baginski and Hassell 1997). As a result, we believe that the quarterly forecasts are particularly well-suited for examining the different incentives family and non-family firms face in their attempts to control Type I and II agency problems, respectively. For example, higher quality forecasting by family firms (in terms of their forecasts being more specific, timely and accurate) is consistent with such firms creating a more transparent information environment and reducing a potentially severe Type II agency problem. Second, we are able to use a non-stock-price measure of the news in these management forecasts in our empirical work, which allows us t o more effectively analyze the markets perception of the differential information content in the forecasts made by family and non-family firms.[2] We also separate our sample of forecasts into guidance (i.e., forecasts made prior to the end of the quarter) and preannouncements (i.e., forecasts made after the quarter ends but before earnings are released). We do this because the forecast horizon associated with preannouncements is very short, sometimes a matter of two or three weeks, and because much of the uncertainty regarding the forthcoming earnings number is resolved by the fiscal quarter end for most, if not all, firms, regardless of whether or not they are controlled by a family. Thus, the Type II agency problem in family firms, if it dominates the Type I agency problem, is more likely to be mitigated through the provision of guidance than preannouncements. This leads us to hypothesize that the characteristics of guidance, but not preannouncements, are systematically related t o family-firm status, and that analysts and investors will react differently to the guidance, but not to preannouncements, issued by family firms, holding all else constant.[3] We test our hypotheses on the quarterly earnings forecasts made between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 index, as identified by Business Week (November 10, 2003) and contained in the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. There are two aspects of our sample that should be highlighted. First, our sample firms are among the largest, most stable and most visible in the U.S. As a result, our results may not generalize to smaller, less visible family firms such as those included in Chen et al.s (2007) sample. Second, our sample period spans the implementation of Reg FD. Thus, we provide evidence that complements the pre-Reg-FD evidence in Chen et al. (2007) and the limited post-Reg-FD evidence in Ali et al. (2007). The results of our empirical tests generally indicate that the guidance provided by family firms is of higher quality than that provided by non-family firms. In particular, after controlling for other influencing factors, we find that the family firms in our sample provide significantly more specific guidance (in terms of forecast form and narrowness of forecast range) than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news or offering confirmatory guidance. We also find that family firms use guidance to make smaller average adjustments to the markets estimate of the upcoming quarterly earnings than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news. This is consistent with their being more timely in offering corrections to analysts estimates. More importantly, we find some evidence of a stronger and quicker response by analysts (as measured by the number of subsequent earnings estimate revisions and the speed with which they occur) to the guidance issued by family firms, and str ong evidence of a significantly greater investor response (as measured by announcement-period abnormal stock returns) to the guidance issued by family firms. These findings, taken together, indicate that guidance is more informative and more useful to the market when it is issued by a family firm. They are also consistent with family firms using guidance to create a more transparent information environment, which therefore, complements the finding of higher quality financial reporting by family firms in Ali et al (2007) and Wang (2006). Consistent with our expectations, we find little evidence of differences in the characteristics of preannouncements issued by family and non-family firms, although there is some (weak) evidence of family-firm preannouncements being more specific when they contain bad news.[4] Also consistent with our expectations, we find no evidence of a differential stock price response to preannouncements made by family and non-family firms, although we do find that analysts response more strongly to family-firm preannouncements, especially when they contain bad news. These results, when considered with the guidance results discussed above, suggest that family firms produce higher quality earnings forecasts than non-family firms, particularly when they are offered as guidance or contain bad news, and that their guidance is more informative and useful to investors and analysts. Thus, our paper provides evidence of family firms using management-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transpare nt information environment. Our paper contributes to two bodies of research: the growing literature on disclosures by family firms, as noted before, and the established literature on management forecasts. While our paper is most closely related to Ali et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006), who examine the mandatory financial disclosures of family firms and the frequency of their voluntary disclosures, we also complement Anderson et al.s (2006) analysis of other dimensions of disclosure transparency. Anderson et al. (2006) find that family firms are significantly more opaque than non-family firms as measured by a summary statistic that captures the effects of trading volume, the bid-ask spread, analyst following and analyst forecast errors. Taken together, the evidence in Anderson et al. (2006) and our paper suggest that certain types of transparent disclosures appear to be better suited than others to mitigating the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling owners. The literature on management forecasts is more mature and, as a result, guides much of the structure for our analysis. Consequently, we follow prior work by Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Baginski and Hassell (1990, 1997), Bamber and Cheon (1998), Baginski et al. (2002, 2004), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and others, in designing our tests. In a recent paper, Hirst et al. (2007) provide a review of this literature and propose a framework for continued research in this area. They observe that choices concerning the characteristics of management earnings forecasts are not yet well understood and suggest that additional work addressing this issue is needed. Our contribution to the literature on management forecasts is to analyze the differential impact of Type I and Type II agency problems on the characteristics of management earnings forecasts provided by family and non-family firms, including the time of their release, as well as the market and analyst reactions to them. Thus, we add to the initia l evidence on the underlying reasons for providing management forecasts in different forms and with different specificity—and on their impact of the stock prices of family and non-family firms. Finally, our results on confirmatory guidance support and extend the results in Clement et al. (2003). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review of the relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our sample and data, and in Section 4, we present the empirical tests. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Family firms are defined in the academic literature as firms in which founders or their descendants exercise control either because they are significant shareholders or because they are part of top management or the board of directors. Not only are family firms common in Europe and Asia (see, for example, LaPorta et al. 1999, Claessens et al, 2000, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001 and Faccio and Lang 2002), they comprise approximately one-third of the SP 500 in the U.S. (Anderson and Reeb 2003a).[5] Further, family members ownership stakes are significant: Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report that in the SP 500, family members hold, on average, 18% of the voting shares in their companies. A large literature on family firms has recently developed in accounting and finance, much of it focused on the differences in agency problems that arise in family and non-family firms.[6] Of particular interest to us are the agency problems arising from (1) the separation of ownership and control, and (2) the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.[7] The papers that examine these conflicts generally argue that (1), referred to as the â€Å"Type I† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), is less important for family firms because of the unusually close alignment of owners and management in those firms when compared to non-family firms (e.g., Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang (2006).[8] They also argue that the tight linkage between some owners and control in family firms exacerbates (2), referred to as the â€Å"Type II† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), in which family members transfer wealth to themselves to the detriment of other sharehol ders. As is well known, such agency problems can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure, suggesting that family firms are more likely to offer a variety of mandatory and voluntary disclosures whose implications are clearer to market participants.[9] In contrast, Wang (2006) suggests that family firms may not face a more severe Type II agency problem if the long-term nature of their investment is well understood by the market. In essence, he argues that long-term investors are less likely to exploit agency problems for short-term gain—thus, family firms may not need to resort to greater frequency or transparency of disclosures. Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) empirically test these competing predictions by comparing aspects of the accounting disclosures made by family and non-family firms. Both find that earnings quality is higher for family firms, especially when a founder CEO is in place. Thus, both provide some evidence consistent with family firms mitigating their Type II agency problems—or responding to the demands of the users of financial statements—with higher quality disclosures. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) document lower discretionary accruals and greater earnings persistence for SP 500 family firms compared to SP 500 non-family firms. In addition, they find that the association between earnings and stock returns is higher for the family firms. Similarly, Wang (2006) finds that SP 500 founding family firms have lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness and less persistence in transitory loss components in earnings. He extends this analysis by considering th e effect of the percentage of common stock owned by family members on the magnitude of the Type II agency problem. Interestingly, he finds that the relation is nonlinear: When founding family ownership is above (approximately) 60%, the quality of the earnings reported by non-family firms exceeds that of family firms. Ali et al. (2007) also provide some evidence inconsistent with family firms mitigating their more severe Type II agency problem through the use of disclosures: They observe that family firms are less forthcoming about their corporate governance practices and that when they employ a dual class share structure, earnings quality is lower relative to when they do not have such a structure. Another method for testing whether family firms mitigate the potentially more severe Type II agency costs—or respond to financial statement users demand for high quality accounting information—through greater frequency and transparency of disclosures is to examine the issuance of management earnings forecasts by family and non-family firms. Complicating this is the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) which suggests that the use of earnings warnings will vary positively with the litigation risk that the firm faces, and inversely with the severity of the firms Type I agency problem (Ali et al. 2007). However, since the Type II agency problem is expected to be more severe and the Type I agency problem less severe in family firms (Ali et al. 2007), family firms would be expected to provide management forecasts to mitigate both types of agency problems, holding litigation risk constant. The relative severity of the Type II agency problem further suggests that family firms earnings forecasts will be of higher quality (i.e., more specific, timely and accurate), and that market participants (e.g., sell-side analysts and investors) will respond more strongly to them. Ali et al. (2007) provide initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis when they observe that family firms are more likely to provide earnings warnings (i.e., guidance that warns of a forthcoming earnings decline) than non-family firms. In a more recent paper, however, Chen et al. (2007) provide evidence that family firms make fewer voluntary disclosures than non-family firms. They collect ownership and founding family information from several sources to identify family firms in the SP 1500 and find that family firms are (1) 8.1% less likely to provide management forecasts of all kinds (i.e., annual and quarterly earnings, revenues, cash flows, etc.), and (2) less likely to hold conference calls as well. They also find, however, that family firms are more likely than non-family firms to issue bad-news earnings warnings. Chen et al. (2007) conclude that these results, when considered collectively, indicate that family firms owners prefer less disclosure because of their long investmen t horizon and effective monitoring of managers, but that their concern with reducing litigation costs results in an increased likelihood of bad news earnings warnings. In this paper, we hope to add to our understanding of the relative importance of the competing incentives studied in previous work by examining (1) the characteristics of management forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (both guidance, which is offered prior to the end of the quarter, and preannouncements, which are offered after quarter-end but before the actual earnings announcement) of family and non-family firms, and (2) the response of sell-side analysts and investors to those forecasts. In particular, we hope to add to our understanding of the disclosure choices of family firms by determining whether their own earnings forecasts are more specific, timely and accurate, consistent with family firms providing higher quality disclosures—and whether those forecasts are viewed as being of higher quality by market participants as measured by their response to the disclosure. We also separate our forecasts into guidance and preannouncements under the assumption that any fami ly-firm effect will be more likely to be observed in guidance because of the longer horizon over which the forecasts can be made. More specifically, in the case of preannouncements, there is a very short forecast horizon (e.g., a few weeks beyond the end of the quarter) and so we do not expect large differences in timeliness of the preannouncements between family and non-family firms. Further, because much of the uncertainty about the earnings numbers is resolved by quarter-end, differences in the specificity of preannouncements between family and non-family firms, if any, are likely to be small. Finally, motives to provide preannouncements are likely to be dominated by the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995).[10] If this is the case, differences in characteristics of voluntary earnings forecasts, and in market participants responses to them, are likely to be concentrated in guidance. As in prior research, we recognize that because of competing forces, whether the guidance of family firms is of higher quality is an empirical question. Thus, our formal hypotheses regarding guidance are non-directional, as in Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006): H1: The specificity, timeliness and content of earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the firm is classified as a family firm. H2: Sell-side analysts and investors responses to earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the issuing firm is classified as a family firm. 3. Sample and Data. Our sample is comprised of 4,130 management quarterly earnings guidance announcements issued between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 as identified by Business Week in its November 10, 2003, issue. Business Week defines a family firm as â€Å"†¦any company where founders or descendants continue to hold positions in top management, on the board, or among the companys shareholders.† To identify family firms, Business Week relies on the methodology developed by Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) as well as their advice and the help of Spencer Stuart as they â€Å"†¦examined regulatory filings, company Web sites and corporate histories† to ensure significant family involvement in the company. (For details, see â€Å"Defining Family,† Business Week, November 10, 2003, p. 111.) Before proceeding, we want to highlight certain aspects of our sample. First, because the Business Week classification pertains to only SP 500 firms, the fi rms in our sample are among the largest, most stable and most profitable companies in the U.S. As a result, our findings might not extend to mid- or small-cap companies. Second, our reliance on the Business Week classification means that we do not form a new sample of family and non-family firms each year. However, as Ali et al. (2007) note, family firm status is sticky, and thus misclassifications due to changing firm status will most likely bias against our finding significant results. Third, Business Weeks classification scheme is designed to identify firms that are controlled by a family without relying on a single proxy for control, such as ownership share. As a result, it captures features of family firms, beyond simply having large blockholders, that are likely to exacerbate Type II agency problems. Fourth, by using Business Weeks classification, which is based on the â€Å"standard† developed by Anderson and Reeb, our results are more easily compared to many prior res ults. Finally, while we recognize that Business Week might not accurately classify every firm, both types of classification errors (i.e., misclassifying firms without significant family control as family firms, and misclassifying firms with significant family control as non-family firms) limit our ability to detect differences in the forecasts of family and non-family firms and therefore bias against our finding significant results. We form our sample by first gathering all forecasts of quarter-ahead earnings made between 1998 and 2006 by the SP 500 as of June 2003 from the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. We lose 1,994 of the original 7,694 observations because of unavailability of (1) necessary Compustat and CRSP data, (2) actual earnings per share and other analyst forecast data from First Call, and (3) observations with multiple actual earnings per share numbers. After deleting stale forecasts (those made before the prior quarters earnings announcement date), we retain all â€Å"guidance† observations (forecasts made at the same time as or after the prior earnings announcement and at or before the quarter end, N = 4,332). We trim the sample to mitigate the effect of outliers as follows. First, we eliminate the top and bottom one-half percent of the management forecast errors in each sample, the top and bottom one-half percent of the forecast surprises in each sample, the top and bott om one-half percent of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns in each sample and finally, the top and bottom one-half percent of return volatility ratios in each sample—and retain the union of the remaining observations. (These variables are defined in the Appendix and will be discussed in detail later.) We then eliminate 62 firm quarter observations whose stock price is less than $5 as of the beginning of the quarter. This results in a final sample of 4,130 guidance announcements. One-hundred-and-forty six of the 177 family firms identified by Business Week (82.5%) provide guidance during our sample period as compared to 240 of the 323 non-family firms in the SP 500 (74.3%). [11] Before turning to the empirical analysis, we note for the reader that the management guidance we gather from the CIG database is not split-adjusted whereas the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the main First Call file are (further, they are rounded to the nearest penny). An I/B/E/S unadjusted data file is available but unfortunately, we would lose a significant number of observations if we were to use it. Consequently, to keep the sample size as large as possible and still allow for comparability, we split-adjust the management guidance from the CIG file using the split-adjustment procedures used for the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the First Call file.[12] 4. Empirical Analysis. 4.1. Univariate Analysis. We present descriptive statistics for the guidance announcements, firm-specific characteristics and variables relating to analysts and stock returns in Table 1. We also include the results of two-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests for each variable. As noted before, we provide a list of variables and their definitions in the Appendix. We begin with forecast characteristic metrics designed to help us understand the differences, if any, in the specificity, timeliness, frequency and content of the earnings forecasts offered by the management of family and non-family firms. We present descriptive statistics first for the form of the forecast (an indicator of specificity) as measured by Forecast Form. As is well known, forecasts in the CIG database take one of several forms, which we code in the following manner: If the forecast is a specific earnings per share number (a point forecast), it is coded as 4; if it is a range of possible earnings per share numbers (a range forecast), it is coded as 3; if it consists of a one-sided directional forecast (either a maximum or minimum forthcoming earnings per share number), it is coded as 2; and if it contains no quantitative information (a qualitative forecast), it is coded as 1.[13] Note that our coding scheme is designed so that a higher value of Forecast Form indicates a mo re specific forecast. To further examine forecast specificity, we focus next on Forecast Width for range forecasts, which measures the difference between the maximum and minimum earnings per share figures offered in the forecast. (A narrower width indicates a more specific forecast.) In later tests, we include point forecasts as forecasts with a width of zero. To examine forecast timeliness, we use Forecast Horizon which is the number of calendar days from the management forecast date until the end of the quarter. More days in the forecast horizon indicate more timely forecasts. Finally, we form Annual Frequency and Quarterly Frequency variables, which measure the number of annual and quarterly management forecasts for each of our sample firms in the CIG database from 1994 through 2006, scaled by the total number of possible forecasting years (for Annual Frequency) or quarters (for Quarterly Frequency) to date. The descriptive statistics and statistical tests for Forecast Form provide initial evidence consistent with family firms issuing significantly more specific guidance than non-family firms. In particular, Forecast Form has slightly higher numerical values, on average, for family firms (p = .028, using the Wilcoxon test).[14] To further explore the potential differences, we examine the frequency distributions of the forms that guidance takes, as presented in Figure 1. As is obvious from the figure, range forecasts are by far the most common form of guidance for both family and non-family firms, making up nearly two-thirds of all guidance in our sample. Further, both family and non-family firms offer approximately 89% of their guidance as point or range forecasts. However, family firms offer relatively more of the more specific point forecasts (28% versus 23% for non-family firms) and relatively fewer of the less specific range forecasts (61% versus 66% for non-family firms).[15] Conver sely, guidance in the form of qualitative statements or minimum/maximum earnings per share numbers is unusual in our sample, regardless of the type of firm examined. The small number of qualitative forecasts in our First Call sample is inconsistent with Hutton et al. (2003) and Miller (2002), who find a substantially larger number of such forecasts when hand-collecting their samples than are included in the First Call database. (Anilowski et al. 2006 also suggest that First Call is more likely to include quantitative forecasts than qualitative ones.) This suggests that our sample is most likely incomplete and most representative when only quantitative forecasts are considered. For these reasons and because many tests require that we restrict attention to point and range forecasts, we will generally focus our discussion on point and range forecasts only. As just noted, range forecasts are the most common type of guidance in our sample. While it is clear from Figure 1 that non-family firms issue more range forecasts as guidance than family firms, Table 1 indicates that those issued by family firms are significantly narrower, as measured by Forecast Width (p = .000 for both the Wilcoxon and the two-sample t tests). This finding, when considered with the preliminary evidence of greater usage of point forecasts by family firms, suggests that guidance issued by family firms is generally more specific than that issued by non-family firms, consistent with H1. The next two forecast c Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms and the Market Reaction to Them Abstract We study the disclosure incentives for family firms by examining the characteristics of their quarterly earnings forecasts and analysts and investors responses to them. Forecasts offered before the fiscal quarter-end (guidance) by SP 500 family firms are generally more specific and timely than those offered by SP 500 non-family firms, particularly when they convey bad news or confirm analysts current expectations. Further, family firm guidance elicits a stronger response from both analysts and investors. While many of these differences largely disappear when the forecasts are offered after the quarter-end but before the earnings announcement itself (preannouncements), family firm preannouncements still tend to be more specific when they contain bad news. These more specific preannouncements also generate a significantly stronger response from analysts. Overall, our results suggest that large, visible family firms use manager-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transparent i nformation environment, and that these forecasts are likely to be most useful in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs when they are issued as guidance. Key Words: Management earnings forecasts, family firms, preannouncements, earnings warnings. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources listed in the text. Introduction. Family firms are generally defined as companies that are significantly influenced by founding family members or their descendants, through large shareholdings and/or operational control.[1] Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) report that family members hold approximately 18% of the equity of the family firms in the SP 500, on average, and control 45% of the CEO positions. In addition, family members often hold seats on the board of directors or are part of upper-level management in these firms (â€Å"Family Inc.†, Business Week, November 10, 2003). The structure inherent in these family firms gives rise to different agency problems than those in firms with much greater separation of ownership and control. Specifically, the family firm structure significantly limits the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control (often referred to as Type I agency problems) while exacerbating those that arise in the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (often referred to as Type II agency problems, see Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang 2006 and Anderson and Reeb 2003a). It is well known that the second type of agency problem can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure. However, it is also possible that reputational concerns may arise from the long-term nature of family members investment in their firm, mitigating this problem and reducing the need for more frequent and transparent disclosure (Wang 2006). The purpose of this paper is to add to our understanding of these competing incentives for differential disclosure by examining the characteristics of quarterly earnings forecasts issued by the management of family firms and the response of sell-side analysts and investors to them. Recent accounting research that examines mandatory financial disclosures by family firms suggests that reputational concerns alone may not be sufficient: Characteristics of family firms mandatory financial reports are consistent with their being used to mitigate the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) show that large family firms offer higher quality financial reports as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, greater ability of earnings to predict cash flows and larger earnings response coefficients. In addition, Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms in the SP 500 are more likely to voluntarily issue earnings forec asts during periods of earnings declines. However, they also find that family firms are less forthcoming in their disclosures about corporate governance. In a paper that was written concurrently with ours, Chen et al. (2007) study the frequency of voluntary disclosures (earnings and non-earnings forecasts and conference calls) from a larger sample of firms that includes the SP 500, SP MidCap 400 and SP SmallCap 600 in the five years before the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). They also find that family firms are more likely to issue bad-news earnings warnings but overall make fewer forward-looking disclosures than non-family firms, and conclude that their results are consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon and better monitoring of management, characteristics that obviate the need for greater disclosure. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the disclosures of family firms by studying one of the most informative and common types of voluntary financial disclosures—the companys own forecasts of its quarterly earnings per share—and sell-side analysts and investors responses to them. More specifically, we examine the characteristics of these disclosures (forecast specificity, surprise and accuracy), and the impact they have on important market indicators—professional analysts earnings estimates and stock prices. Thus, our analysis is designed to provide additional evidence on the relation between ownership structure and the quality of the firms information environment and, in particular, complements the existing empirical evidence on the characteristics and informativenesss of mandatory financial disclosures made by family and non-family firms (Ali et al. 2007 and Wang 2006). As noted above, we focus on a particular type of voluntary disclosure, managements forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and do so for two reasons. First, prior research indicates that these forecasts are highly value-relevant—and more value-relevant than management forecasts of annual earnings per share (Pownall et al. 1993, Baginski and Hassell 1997). As a result, we believe that the quarterly forecasts are particularly well-suited for examining the different incentives family and non-family firms face in their attempts to control Type I and II agency problems, respectively. For example, higher quality forecasting by family firms (in terms of their forecasts being more specific, timely and accurate) is consistent with such firms creating a more transparent information environment and reducing a potentially severe Type II agency problem. Second, we are able to use a non-stock-price measure of the news in these management forecasts in our empirical work, which allows us t o more effectively analyze the markets perception of the differential information content in the forecasts made by family and non-family firms.[2] We also separate our sample of forecasts into guidance (i.e., forecasts made prior to the end of the quarter) and preannouncements (i.e., forecasts made after the quarter ends but before earnings are released). We do this because the forecast horizon associated with preannouncements is very short, sometimes a matter of two or three weeks, and because much of the uncertainty regarding the forthcoming earnings number is resolved by the fiscal quarter end for most, if not all, firms, regardless of whether or not they are controlled by a family. Thus, the Type II agency problem in family firms, if it dominates the Type I agency problem, is more likely to be mitigated through the provision of guidance than preannouncements. This leads us to hypothesize that the characteristics of guidance, but not preannouncements, are systematically related t o family-firm status, and that analysts and investors will react differently to the guidance, but not to preannouncements, issued by family firms, holding all else constant.[3] We test our hypotheses on the quarterly earnings forecasts made between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 index, as identified by Business Week (November 10, 2003) and contained in the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. There are two aspects of our sample that should be highlighted. First, our sample firms are among the largest, most stable and most visible in the U.S. As a result, our results may not generalize to smaller, less visible family firms such as those included in Chen et al.s (2007) sample. Second, our sample period spans the implementation of Reg FD. Thus, we provide evidence that complements the pre-Reg-FD evidence in Chen et al. (2007) and the limited post-Reg-FD evidence in Ali et al. (2007). The results of our empirical tests generally indicate that the guidance provided by family firms is of higher quality than that provided by non-family firms. In particular, after controlling for other influencing factors, we find that the family firms in our sample provide significantly more specific guidance (in terms of forecast form and narrowness of forecast range) than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news or offering confirmatory guidance. We also find that family firms use guidance to make smaller average adjustments to the markets estimate of the upcoming quarterly earnings than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news. This is consistent with their being more timely in offering corrections to analysts estimates. More importantly, we find some evidence of a stronger and quicker response by analysts (as measured by the number of subsequent earnings estimate revisions and the speed with which they occur) to the guidance issued by family firms, and str ong evidence of a significantly greater investor response (as measured by announcement-period abnormal stock returns) to the guidance issued by family firms. These findings, taken together, indicate that guidance is more informative and more useful to the market when it is issued by a family firm. They are also consistent with family firms using guidance to create a more transparent information environment, which therefore, complements the finding of higher quality financial reporting by family firms in Ali et al (2007) and Wang (2006). Consistent with our expectations, we find little evidence of differences in the characteristics of preannouncements issued by family and non-family firms, although there is some (weak) evidence of family-firm preannouncements being more specific when they contain bad news.[4] Also consistent with our expectations, we find no evidence of a differential stock price response to preannouncements made by family and non-family firms, although we do find that analysts response more strongly to family-firm preannouncements, especially when they contain bad news. These results, when considered with the guidance results discussed above, suggest that family firms produce higher quality earnings forecasts than non-family firms, particularly when they are offered as guidance or contain bad news, and that their guidance is more informative and useful to investors and analysts. Thus, our paper provides evidence of family firms using management-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transpare nt information environment. Our paper contributes to two bodies of research: the growing literature on disclosures by family firms, as noted before, and the established literature on management forecasts. While our paper is most closely related to Ali et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006), who examine the mandatory financial disclosures of family firms and the frequency of their voluntary disclosures, we also complement Anderson et al.s (2006) analysis of other dimensions of disclosure transparency. Anderson et al. (2006) find that family firms are significantly more opaque than non-family firms as measured by a summary statistic that captures the effects of trading volume, the bid-ask spread, analyst following and analyst forecast errors. Taken together, the evidence in Anderson et al. (2006) and our paper suggest that certain types of transparent disclosures appear to be better suited than others to mitigating the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling owners. The literature on management forecasts is more mature and, as a result, guides much of the structure for our analysis. Consequently, we follow prior work by Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Baginski and Hassell (1990, 1997), Bamber and Cheon (1998), Baginski et al. (2002, 2004), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and others, in designing our tests. In a recent paper, Hirst et al. (2007) provide a review of this literature and propose a framework for continued research in this area. They observe that choices concerning the characteristics of management earnings forecasts are not yet well understood and suggest that additional work addressing this issue is needed. Our contribution to the literature on management forecasts is to analyze the differential impact of Type I and Type II agency problems on the characteristics of management earnings forecasts provided by family and non-family firms, including the time of their release, as well as the market and analyst reactions to them. Thus, we add to the initia l evidence on the underlying reasons for providing management forecasts in different forms and with different specificity—and on their impact of the stock prices of family and non-family firms. Finally, our results on confirmatory guidance support and extend the results in Clement et al. (2003). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review of the relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our sample and data, and in Section 4, we present the empirical tests. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Family firms are defined in the academic literature as firms in which founders or their descendants exercise control either because they are significant shareholders or because they are part of top management or the board of directors. Not only are family firms common in Europe and Asia (see, for example, LaPorta et al. 1999, Claessens et al, 2000, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001 and Faccio and Lang 2002), they comprise approximately one-third of the SP 500 in the U.S. (Anderson and Reeb 2003a).[5] Further, family members ownership stakes are significant: Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report that in the SP 500, family members hold, on average, 18% of the voting shares in their companies. A large literature on family firms has recently developed in accounting and finance, much of it focused on the differences in agency problems that arise in family and non-family firms.[6] Of particular interest to us are the agency problems arising from (1) the separation of ownership and control, and (2) the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.[7] The papers that examine these conflicts generally argue that (1), referred to as the â€Å"Type I† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), is less important for family firms because of the unusually close alignment of owners and management in those firms when compared to non-family firms (e.g., Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang (2006).[8] They also argue that the tight linkage between some owners and control in family firms exacerbates (2), referred to as the â€Å"Type II† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), in which family members transfer wealth to themselves to the detriment of other sharehol ders. As is well known, such agency problems can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure, suggesting that family firms are more likely to offer a variety of mandatory and voluntary disclosures whose implications are clearer to market participants.[9] In contrast, Wang (2006) suggests that family firms may not face a more severe Type II agency problem if the long-term nature of their investment is well understood by the market. In essence, he argues that long-term investors are less likely to exploit agency problems for short-term gain—thus, family firms may not need to resort to greater frequency or transparency of disclosures. Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) empirically test these competing predictions by comparing aspects of the accounting disclosures made by family and non-family firms. Both find that earnings quality is higher for family firms, especially when a founder CEO is in place. Thus, both provide some evidence consistent with family firms mitigating their Type II agency problems—or responding to the demands of the users of financial statements—with higher quality disclosures. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) document lower discretionary accruals and greater earnings persistence for SP 500 family firms compared to SP 500 non-family firms. In addition, they find that the association between earnings and stock returns is higher for the family firms. Similarly, Wang (2006) finds that SP 500 founding family firms have lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness and less persistence in transitory loss components in earnings. He extends this analysis by considering th e effect of the percentage of common stock owned by family members on the magnitude of the Type II agency problem. Interestingly, he finds that the relation is nonlinear: When founding family ownership is above (approximately) 60%, the quality of the earnings reported by non-family firms exceeds that of family firms. Ali et al. (2007) also provide some evidence inconsistent with family firms mitigating their more severe Type II agency problem through the use of disclosures: They observe that family firms are less forthcoming about their corporate governance practices and that when they employ a dual class share structure, earnings quality is lower relative to when they do not have such a structure. Another method for testing whether family firms mitigate the potentially more severe Type II agency costs—or respond to financial statement users demand for high quality accounting information—through greater frequency and transparency of disclosures is to examine the issuance of management earnings forecasts by family and non-family firms. Complicating this is the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) which suggests that the use of earnings warnings will vary positively with the litigation risk that the firm faces, and inversely with the severity of the firms Type I agency problem (Ali et al. 2007). However, since the Type II agency problem is expected to be more severe and the Type I agency problem less severe in family firms (Ali et al. 2007), family firms would be expected to provide management forecasts to mitigate both types of agency problems, holding litigation risk constant. The relative severity of the Type II agency problem further suggests that family firms earnings forecasts will be of higher quality (i.e., more specific, timely and accurate), and that market participants (e.g., sell-side analysts and investors) will respond more strongly to them. Ali et al. (2007) provide initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis when they observe that family firms are more likely to provide earnings warnings (i.e., guidance that warns of a forthcoming earnings decline) than non-family firms. In a more recent paper, however, Chen et al. (2007) provide evidence that family firms make fewer voluntary disclosures than non-family firms. They collect ownership and founding family information from several sources to identify family firms in the SP 1500 and find that family firms are (1) 8.1% less likely to provide management forecasts of all kinds (i.e., annual and quarterly earnings, revenues, cash flows, etc.), and (2) less likely to hold conference calls as well. They also find, however, that family firms are more likely than non-family firms to issue bad-news earnings warnings. Chen et al. (2007) conclude that these results, when considered collectively, indicate that family firms owners prefer less disclosure because of their long investmen t horizon and effective monitoring of managers, but that their concern with reducing litigation costs results in an increased likelihood of bad news earnings warnings. In this paper, we hope to add to our understanding of the relative importance of the competing incentives studied in previous work by examining (1) the characteristics of management forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (both guidance, which is offered prior to the end of the quarter, and preannouncements, which are offered after quarter-end but before the actual earnings announcement) of family and non-family firms, and (2) the response of sell-side analysts and investors to those forecasts. In particular, we hope to add to our understanding of the disclosure choices of family firms by determining whether their own earnings forecasts are more specific, timely and accurate, consistent with family firms providing higher quality disclosures—and whether those forecasts are viewed as being of higher quality by market participants as measured by their response to the disclosure. We also separate our forecasts into guidance and preannouncements under the assumption that any fami ly-firm effect will be more likely to be observed in guidance because of the longer horizon over which the forecasts can be made. More specifically, in the case of preannouncements, there is a very short forecast horizon (e.g., a few weeks beyond the end of the quarter) and so we do not expect large differences in timeliness of the preannouncements between family and non-family firms. Further, because much of the uncertainty about the earnings numbers is resolved by quarter-end, differences in the specificity of preannouncements between family and non-family firms, if any, are likely to be small. Finally, motives to provide preannouncements are likely to be dominated by the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995).[10] If this is the case, differences in characteristics of voluntary earnings forecasts, and in market participants responses to them, are likely to be concentrated in guidance. As in prior research, we recognize that because of competing forces, whether the guidance of family firms is of higher quality is an empirical question. Thus, our formal hypotheses regarding guidance are non-directional, as in Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006): H1: The specificity, timeliness and content of earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the firm is classified as a family firm. H2: Sell-side analysts and investors responses to earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the issuing firm is classified as a family firm. 3. Sample and Data. Our sample is comprised of 4,130 management quarterly earnings guidance announcements issued between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 as identified by Business Week in its November 10, 2003, issue. Business Week defines a family firm as â€Å"†¦any company where founders or descendants continue to hold positions in top management, on the board, or among the companys shareholders.† To identify family firms, Business Week relies on the methodology developed by Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) as well as their advice and the help of Spencer Stuart as they â€Å"†¦examined regulatory filings, company Web sites and corporate histories† to ensure significant family involvement in the company. (For details, see â€Å"Defining Family,† Business Week, November 10, 2003, p. 111.) Before proceeding, we want to highlight certain aspects of our sample. First, because the Business Week classification pertains to only SP 500 firms, the fi rms in our sample are among the largest, most stable and most profitable companies in the U.S. As a result, our findings might not extend to mid- or small-cap companies. Second, our reliance on the Business Week classification means that we do not form a new sample of family and non-family firms each year. However, as Ali et al. (2007) note, family firm status is sticky, and thus misclassifications due to changing firm status will most likely bias against our finding significant results. Third, Business Weeks classification scheme is designed to identify firms that are controlled by a family without relying on a single proxy for control, such as ownership share. As a result, it captures features of family firms, beyond simply having large blockholders, that are likely to exacerbate Type II agency problems. Fourth, by using Business Weeks classification, which is based on the â€Å"standard† developed by Anderson and Reeb, our results are more easily compared to many prior res ults. Finally, while we recognize that Business Week might not accurately classify every firm, both types of classification errors (i.e., misclassifying firms without significant family control as family firms, and misclassifying firms with significant family control as non-family firms) limit our ability to detect differences in the forecasts of family and non-family firms and therefore bias against our finding significant results. We form our sample by first gathering all forecasts of quarter-ahead earnings made between 1998 and 2006 by the SP 500 as of June 2003 from the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. We lose 1,994 of the original 7,694 observations because of unavailability of (1) necessary Compustat and CRSP data, (2) actual earnings per share and other analyst forecast data from First Call, and (3) observations with multiple actual earnings per share numbers. After deleting stale forecasts (those made before the prior quarters earnings announcement date), we retain all â€Å"guidance† observations (forecasts made at the same time as or after the prior earnings announcement and at or before the quarter end, N = 4,332). We trim the sample to mitigate the effect of outliers as follows. First, we eliminate the top and bottom one-half percent of the management forecast errors in each sample, the top and bottom one-half percent of the forecast surprises in each sample, the top and bott om one-half percent of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns in each sample and finally, the top and bottom one-half percent of return volatility ratios in each sample—and retain the union of the remaining observations. (These variables are defined in the Appendix and will be discussed in detail later.) We then eliminate 62 firm quarter observations whose stock price is less than $5 as of the beginning of the quarter. This results in a final sample of 4,130 guidance announcements. One-hundred-and-forty six of the 177 family firms identified by Business Week (82.5%) provide guidance during our sample period as compared to 240 of the 323 non-family firms in the SP 500 (74.3%). [11] Before turning to the empirical analysis, we note for the reader that the management guidance we gather from the CIG database is not split-adjusted whereas the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the main First Call file are (further, they are rounded to the nearest penny). An I/B/E/S unadjusted data file is available but unfortunately, we would lose a significant number of observations if we were to use it. Consequently, to keep the sample size as large as possible and still allow for comparability, we split-adjust the management guidance from the CIG file using the split-adjustment procedures used for the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the First Call file.[12] 4. Empirical Analysis. 4.1. Univariate Analysis. We present descriptive statistics for the guidance announcements, firm-specific characteristics and variables relating to analysts and stock returns in Table 1. We also include the results of two-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests for each variable. As noted before, we provide a list of variables and their definitions in the Appendix. We begin with forecast characteristic metrics designed to help us understand the differences, if any, in the specificity, timeliness, frequency and content of the earnings forecasts offered by the management of family and non-family firms. We present descriptive statistics first for the form of the forecast (an indicator of specificity) as measured by Forecast Form. As is well known, forecasts in the CIG database take one of several forms, which we code in the following manner: If the forecast is a specific earnings per share number (a point forecast), it is coded as 4; if it is a range of possible earnings per share numbers (a range forecast), it is coded as 3; if it consists of a one-sided directional forecast (either a maximum or minimum forthcoming earnings per share number), it is coded as 2; and if it contains no quantitative information (a qualitative forecast), it is coded as 1.[13] Note that our coding scheme is designed so that a higher value of Forecast Form indicates a mo re specific forecast. To further examine forecast specificity, we focus next on Forecast Width for range forecasts, which measures the difference between the maximum and minimum earnings per share figures offered in the forecast. (A narrower width indicates a more specific forecast.) In later tests, we include point forecasts as forecasts with a width of zero. To examine forecast timeliness, we use Forecast Horizon which is the number of calendar days from the management forecast date until the end of the quarter. More days in the forecast horizon indicate more timely forecasts. Finally, we form Annual Frequency and Quarterly Frequency variables, which measure the number of annual and quarterly management forecasts for each of our sample firms in the CIG database from 1994 through 2006, scaled by the total number of possible forecasting years (for Annual Frequency) or quarters (for Quarterly Frequency) to date. The descriptive statistics and statistical tests for Forecast Form provide initial evidence consistent with family firms issuing significantly more specific guidance than non-family firms. In particular, Forecast Form has slightly higher numerical values, on average, for family firms (p = .028, using the Wilcoxon test).[14] To further explore the potential differences, we examine the frequency distributions of the forms that guidance takes, as presented in Figure 1. As is obvious from the figure, range forecasts are by far the most common form of guidance for both family and non-family firms, making up nearly two-thirds of all guidance in our sample. Further, both family and non-family firms offer approximately 89% of their guidance as point or range forecasts. However, family firms offer relatively more of the more specific point forecasts (28% versus 23% for non-family firms) and relatively fewer of the less specific range forecasts (61% versus 66% for non-family firms).[15] Conver sely, guidance in the form of qualitative statements or minimum/maximum earnings per share numbers is unusual in our sample, regardless of the type of firm examined. The small number of qualitative forecasts in our First Call sample is inconsistent with Hutton et al. (2003) and Miller (2002), who find a substantially larger number of such forecasts when hand-collecting their samples than are included in the First Call database. (Anilowski et al. 2006 also suggest that First Call is more likely to include quantitative forecasts than qualitative ones.) This suggests that our sample is most likely incomplete and most representative when only quantitative forecasts are considered. For these reasons and because many tests require that we restrict attention to point and range forecasts, we will generally focus our discussion on point and range forecasts only. As just noted, range forecasts are the most common type of guidance in our sample. While it is clear from Figure 1 that non-family firms issue more range forecasts as guidance than family firms, Table 1 indicates that those issued by family firms are significantly narrower, as measured by Forecast Width (p = .000 for both the Wilcoxon and the two-sample t tests). This finding, when considered with the preliminary evidence of greater usage of point forecasts by family firms, suggests that guidance issued by family firms is generally more specific than that issued by non-family firms, consistent with H1. The next two forecast c