Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms

Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms and the Market Reaction to Them Abstract We study the disclosure incentives for family firms by examining the characteristics of their quarterly earnings forecasts and analysts and investors responses to them. Forecasts offered before the fiscal quarter-end (guidance) by SP 500 family firms are generally more specific and timely than those offered by SP 500 non-family firms, particularly when they convey bad news or confirm analysts current expectations. Further, family firm guidance elicits a stronger response from both analysts and investors. While many of these differences largely disappear when the forecasts are offered after the quarter-end but before the earnings announcement itself (preannouncements), family firm preannouncements still tend to be more specific when they contain bad news. These more specific preannouncements also generate a significantly stronger response from analysts. Overall, our results suggest that large, visible family firms use manager-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transparent i nformation environment, and that these forecasts are likely to be most useful in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs when they are issued as guidance. Key Words: Management earnings forecasts, family firms, preannouncements, earnings warnings. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources listed in the text. Introduction. Family firms are generally defined as companies that are significantly influenced by founding family members or their descendants, through large shareholdings and/or operational control.[1] Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) report that family members hold approximately 18% of the equity of the family firms in the SP 500, on average, and control 45% of the CEO positions. In addition, family members often hold seats on the board of directors or are part of upper-level management in these firms (â€Å"Family Inc.†, Business Week, November 10, 2003). The structure inherent in these family firms gives rise to different agency problems than those in firms with much greater separation of ownership and control. Specifically, the family firm structure significantly limits the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control (often referred to as Type I agency problems) while exacerbating those that arise in the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (often referred to as Type II agency problems, see Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang 2006 and Anderson and Reeb 2003a). It is well known that the second type of agency problem can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure. However, it is also possible that reputational concerns may arise from the long-term nature of family members investment in their firm, mitigating this problem and reducing the need for more frequent and transparent disclosure (Wang 2006). The purpose of this paper is to add to our understanding of these competing incentives for differential disclosure by examining the characteristics of quarterly earnings forecasts issued by the management of family firms and the response of sell-side analysts and investors to them. Recent accounting research that examines mandatory financial disclosures by family firms suggests that reputational concerns alone may not be sufficient: Characteristics of family firms mandatory financial reports are consistent with their being used to mitigate the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) show that large family firms offer higher quality financial reports as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, greater ability of earnings to predict cash flows and larger earnings response coefficients. In addition, Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms in the SP 500 are more likely to voluntarily issue earnings forec asts during periods of earnings declines. However, they also find that family firms are less forthcoming in their disclosures about corporate governance. In a paper that was written concurrently with ours, Chen et al. (2007) study the frequency of voluntary disclosures (earnings and non-earnings forecasts and conference calls) from a larger sample of firms that includes the SP 500, SP MidCap 400 and SP SmallCap 600 in the five years before the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). They also find that family firms are more likely to issue bad-news earnings warnings but overall make fewer forward-looking disclosures than non-family firms, and conclude that their results are consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon and better monitoring of management, characteristics that obviate the need for greater disclosure. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the disclosures of family firms by studying one of the most informative and common types of voluntary financial disclosures—the companys own forecasts of its quarterly earnings per share—and sell-side analysts and investors responses to them. More specifically, we examine the characteristics of these disclosures (forecast specificity, surprise and accuracy), and the impact they have on important market indicators—professional analysts earnings estimates and stock prices. Thus, our analysis is designed to provide additional evidence on the relation between ownership structure and the quality of the firms information environment and, in particular, complements the existing empirical evidence on the characteristics and informativenesss of mandatory financial disclosures made by family and non-family firms (Ali et al. 2007 and Wang 2006). As noted above, we focus on a particular type of voluntary disclosure, managements forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and do so for two reasons. First, prior research indicates that these forecasts are highly value-relevant—and more value-relevant than management forecasts of annual earnings per share (Pownall et al. 1993, Baginski and Hassell 1997). As a result, we believe that the quarterly forecasts are particularly well-suited for examining the different incentives family and non-family firms face in their attempts to control Type I and II agency problems, respectively. For example, higher quality forecasting by family firms (in terms of their forecasts being more specific, timely and accurate) is consistent with such firms creating a more transparent information environment and reducing a potentially severe Type II agency problem. Second, we are able to use a non-stock-price measure of the news in these management forecasts in our empirical work, which allows us t o more effectively analyze the markets perception of the differential information content in the forecasts made by family and non-family firms.[2] We also separate our sample of forecasts into guidance (i.e., forecasts made prior to the end of the quarter) and preannouncements (i.e., forecasts made after the quarter ends but before earnings are released). We do this because the forecast horizon associated with preannouncements is very short, sometimes a matter of two or three weeks, and because much of the uncertainty regarding the forthcoming earnings number is resolved by the fiscal quarter end for most, if not all, firms, regardless of whether or not they are controlled by a family. Thus, the Type II agency problem in family firms, if it dominates the Type I agency problem, is more likely to be mitigated through the provision of guidance than preannouncements. This leads us to hypothesize that the characteristics of guidance, but not preannouncements, are systematically related t o family-firm status, and that analysts and investors will react differently to the guidance, but not to preannouncements, issued by family firms, holding all else constant.[3] We test our hypotheses on the quarterly earnings forecasts made between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 index, as identified by Business Week (November 10, 2003) and contained in the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. There are two aspects of our sample that should be highlighted. First, our sample firms are among the largest, most stable and most visible in the U.S. As a result, our results may not generalize to smaller, less visible family firms such as those included in Chen et al.s (2007) sample. Second, our sample period spans the implementation of Reg FD. Thus, we provide evidence that complements the pre-Reg-FD evidence in Chen et al. (2007) and the limited post-Reg-FD evidence in Ali et al. (2007). The results of our empirical tests generally indicate that the guidance provided by family firms is of higher quality than that provided by non-family firms. In particular, after controlling for other influencing factors, we find that the family firms in our sample provide significantly more specific guidance (in terms of forecast form and narrowness of forecast range) than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news or offering confirmatory guidance. We also find that family firms use guidance to make smaller average adjustments to the markets estimate of the upcoming quarterly earnings than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news. This is consistent with their being more timely in offering corrections to analysts estimates. More importantly, we find some evidence of a stronger and quicker response by analysts (as measured by the number of subsequent earnings estimate revisions and the speed with which they occur) to the guidance issued by family firms, and str ong evidence of a significantly greater investor response (as measured by announcement-period abnormal stock returns) to the guidance issued by family firms. These findings, taken together, indicate that guidance is more informative and more useful to the market when it is issued by a family firm. They are also consistent with family firms using guidance to create a more transparent information environment, which therefore, complements the finding of higher quality financial reporting by family firms in Ali et al (2007) and Wang (2006). Consistent with our expectations, we find little evidence of differences in the characteristics of preannouncements issued by family and non-family firms, although there is some (weak) evidence of family-firm preannouncements being more specific when they contain bad news.[4] Also consistent with our expectations, we find no evidence of a differential stock price response to preannouncements made by family and non-family firms, although we do find that analysts response more strongly to family-firm preannouncements, especially when they contain bad news. These results, when considered with the guidance results discussed above, suggest that family firms produce higher quality earnings forecasts than non-family firms, particularly when they are offered as guidance or contain bad news, and that their guidance is more informative and useful to investors and analysts. Thus, our paper provides evidence of family firms using management-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transpare nt information environment. Our paper contributes to two bodies of research: the growing literature on disclosures by family firms, as noted before, and the established literature on management forecasts. While our paper is most closely related to Ali et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006), who examine the mandatory financial disclosures of family firms and the frequency of their voluntary disclosures, we also complement Anderson et al.s (2006) analysis of other dimensions of disclosure transparency. Anderson et al. (2006) find that family firms are significantly more opaque than non-family firms as measured by a summary statistic that captures the effects of trading volume, the bid-ask spread, analyst following and analyst forecast errors. Taken together, the evidence in Anderson et al. (2006) and our paper suggest that certain types of transparent disclosures appear to be better suited than others to mitigating the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling owners. The literature on management forecasts is more mature and, as a result, guides much of the structure for our analysis. Consequently, we follow prior work by Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Baginski and Hassell (1990, 1997), Bamber and Cheon (1998), Baginski et al. (2002, 2004), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and others, in designing our tests. In a recent paper, Hirst et al. (2007) provide a review of this literature and propose a framework for continued research in this area. They observe that choices concerning the characteristics of management earnings forecasts are not yet well understood and suggest that additional work addressing this issue is needed. Our contribution to the literature on management forecasts is to analyze the differential impact of Type I and Type II agency problems on the characteristics of management earnings forecasts provided by family and non-family firms, including the time of their release, as well as the market and analyst reactions to them. Thus, we add to the initia l evidence on the underlying reasons for providing management forecasts in different forms and with different specificity—and on their impact of the stock prices of family and non-family firms. Finally, our results on confirmatory guidance support and extend the results in Clement et al. (2003). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review of the relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our sample and data, and in Section 4, we present the empirical tests. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Family firms are defined in the academic literature as firms in which founders or their descendants exercise control either because they are significant shareholders or because they are part of top management or the board of directors. Not only are family firms common in Europe and Asia (see, for example, LaPorta et al. 1999, Claessens et al, 2000, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001 and Faccio and Lang 2002), they comprise approximately one-third of the SP 500 in the U.S. (Anderson and Reeb 2003a).[5] Further, family members ownership stakes are significant: Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report that in the SP 500, family members hold, on average, 18% of the voting shares in their companies. A large literature on family firms has recently developed in accounting and finance, much of it focused on the differences in agency problems that arise in family and non-family firms.[6] Of particular interest to us are the agency problems arising from (1) the separation of ownership and control, and (2) the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.[7] The papers that examine these conflicts generally argue that (1), referred to as the â€Å"Type I† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), is less important for family firms because of the unusually close alignment of owners and management in those firms when compared to non-family firms (e.g., Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang (2006).[8] They also argue that the tight linkage between some owners and control in family firms exacerbates (2), referred to as the â€Å"Type II† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), in which family members transfer wealth to themselves to the detriment of other sharehol ders. As is well known, such agency problems can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure, suggesting that family firms are more likely to offer a variety of mandatory and voluntary disclosures whose implications are clearer to market participants.[9] In contrast, Wang (2006) suggests that family firms may not face a more severe Type II agency problem if the long-term nature of their investment is well understood by the market. In essence, he argues that long-term investors are less likely to exploit agency problems for short-term gain—thus, family firms may not need to resort to greater frequency or transparency of disclosures. Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) empirically test these competing predictions by comparing aspects of the accounting disclosures made by family and non-family firms. Both find that earnings quality is higher for family firms, especially when a founder CEO is in place. Thus, both provide some evidence consistent with family firms mitigating their Type II agency problems—or responding to the demands of the users of financial statements—with higher quality disclosures. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) document lower discretionary accruals and greater earnings persistence for SP 500 family firms compared to SP 500 non-family firms. In addition, they find that the association between earnings and stock returns is higher for the family firms. Similarly, Wang (2006) finds that SP 500 founding family firms have lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness and less persistence in transitory loss components in earnings. He extends this analysis by considering th e effect of the percentage of common stock owned by family members on the magnitude of the Type II agency problem. Interestingly, he finds that the relation is nonlinear: When founding family ownership is above (approximately) 60%, the quality of the earnings reported by non-family firms exceeds that of family firms. Ali et al. (2007) also provide some evidence inconsistent with family firms mitigating their more severe Type II agency problem through the use of disclosures: They observe that family firms are less forthcoming about their corporate governance practices and that when they employ a dual class share structure, earnings quality is lower relative to when they do not have such a structure. Another method for testing whether family firms mitigate the potentially more severe Type II agency costs—or respond to financial statement users demand for high quality accounting information—through greater frequency and transparency of disclosures is to examine the issuance of management earnings forecasts by family and non-family firms. Complicating this is the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) which suggests that the use of earnings warnings will vary positively with the litigation risk that the firm faces, and inversely with the severity of the firms Type I agency problem (Ali et al. 2007). However, since the Type II agency problem is expected to be more severe and the Type I agency problem less severe in family firms (Ali et al. 2007), family firms would be expected to provide management forecasts to mitigate both types of agency problems, holding litigation risk constant. The relative severity of the Type II agency problem further suggests that family firms earnings forecasts will be of higher quality (i.e., more specific, timely and accurate), and that market participants (e.g., sell-side analysts and investors) will respond more strongly to them. Ali et al. (2007) provide initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis when they observe that family firms are more likely to provide earnings warnings (i.e., guidance that warns of a forthcoming earnings decline) than non-family firms. In a more recent paper, however, Chen et al. (2007) provide evidence that family firms make fewer voluntary disclosures than non-family firms. They collect ownership and founding family information from several sources to identify family firms in the SP 1500 and find that family firms are (1) 8.1% less likely to provide management forecasts of all kinds (i.e., annual and quarterly earnings, revenues, cash flows, etc.), and (2) less likely to hold conference calls as well. They also find, however, that family firms are more likely than non-family firms to issue bad-news earnings warnings. Chen et al. (2007) conclude that these results, when considered collectively, indicate that family firms owners prefer less disclosure because of their long investmen t horizon and effective monitoring of managers, but that their concern with reducing litigation costs results in an increased likelihood of bad news earnings warnings. In this paper, we hope to add to our understanding of the relative importance of the competing incentives studied in previous work by examining (1) the characteristics of management forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (both guidance, which is offered prior to the end of the quarter, and preannouncements, which are offered after quarter-end but before the actual earnings announcement) of family and non-family firms, and (2) the response of sell-side analysts and investors to those forecasts. In particular, we hope to add to our understanding of the disclosure choices of family firms by determining whether their own earnings forecasts are more specific, timely and accurate, consistent with family firms providing higher quality disclosures—and whether those forecasts are viewed as being of higher quality by market participants as measured by their response to the disclosure. We also separate our forecasts into guidance and preannouncements under the assumption that any fami ly-firm effect will be more likely to be observed in guidance because of the longer horizon over which the forecasts can be made. More specifically, in the case of preannouncements, there is a very short forecast horizon (e.g., a few weeks beyond the end of the quarter) and so we do not expect large differences in timeliness of the preannouncements between family and non-family firms. Further, because much of the uncertainty about the earnings numbers is resolved by quarter-end, differences in the specificity of preannouncements between family and non-family firms, if any, are likely to be small. Finally, motives to provide preannouncements are likely to be dominated by the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995).[10] If this is the case, differences in characteristics of voluntary earnings forecasts, and in market participants responses to them, are likely to be concentrated in guidance. As in prior research, we recognize that because of competing forces, whether the guidance of family firms is of higher quality is an empirical question. Thus, our formal hypotheses regarding guidance are non-directional, as in Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006): H1: The specificity, timeliness and content of earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the firm is classified as a family firm. H2: Sell-side analysts and investors responses to earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the issuing firm is classified as a family firm. 3. Sample and Data. Our sample is comprised of 4,130 management quarterly earnings guidance announcements issued between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 as identified by Business Week in its November 10, 2003, issue. Business Week defines a family firm as â€Å"†¦any company where founders or descendants continue to hold positions in top management, on the board, or among the companys shareholders.† To identify family firms, Business Week relies on the methodology developed by Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) as well as their advice and the help of Spencer Stuart as they â€Å"†¦examined regulatory filings, company Web sites and corporate histories† to ensure significant family involvement in the company. (For details, see â€Å"Defining Family,† Business Week, November 10, 2003, p. 111.) Before proceeding, we want to highlight certain aspects of our sample. First, because the Business Week classification pertains to only SP 500 firms, the fi rms in our sample are among the largest, most stable and most profitable companies in the U.S. As a result, our findings might not extend to mid- or small-cap companies. Second, our reliance on the Business Week classification means that we do not form a new sample of family and non-family firms each year. However, as Ali et al. (2007) note, family firm status is sticky, and thus misclassifications due to changing firm status will most likely bias against our finding significant results. Third, Business Weeks classification scheme is designed to identify firms that are controlled by a family without relying on a single proxy for control, such as ownership share. As a result, it captures features of family firms, beyond simply having large blockholders, that are likely to exacerbate Type II agency problems. Fourth, by using Business Weeks classification, which is based on the â€Å"standard† developed by Anderson and Reeb, our results are more easily compared to many prior res ults. Finally, while we recognize that Business Week might not accurately classify every firm, both types of classification errors (i.e., misclassifying firms without significant family control as family firms, and misclassifying firms with significant family control as non-family firms) limit our ability to detect differences in the forecasts of family and non-family firms and therefore bias against our finding significant results. We form our sample by first gathering all forecasts of quarter-ahead earnings made between 1998 and 2006 by the SP 500 as of June 2003 from the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. We lose 1,994 of the original 7,694 observations because of unavailability of (1) necessary Compustat and CRSP data, (2) actual earnings per share and other analyst forecast data from First Call, and (3) observations with multiple actual earnings per share numbers. After deleting stale forecasts (those made before the prior quarters earnings announcement date), we retain all â€Å"guidance† observations (forecasts made at the same time as or after the prior earnings announcement and at or before the quarter end, N = 4,332). We trim the sample to mitigate the effect of outliers as follows. First, we eliminate the top and bottom one-half percent of the management forecast errors in each sample, the top and bottom one-half percent of the forecast surprises in each sample, the top and bott om one-half percent of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns in each sample and finally, the top and bottom one-half percent of return volatility ratios in each sample—and retain the union of the remaining observations. (These variables are defined in the Appendix and will be discussed in detail later.) We then eliminate 62 firm quarter observations whose stock price is less than $5 as of the beginning of the quarter. This results in a final sample of 4,130 guidance announcements. One-hundred-and-forty six of the 177 family firms identified by Business Week (82.5%) provide guidance during our sample period as compared to 240 of the 323 non-family firms in the SP 500 (74.3%). [11] Before turning to the empirical analysis, we note for the reader that the management guidance we gather from the CIG database is not split-adjusted whereas the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the main First Call file are (further, they are rounded to the nearest penny). An I/B/E/S unadjusted data file is available but unfortunately, we would lose a significant number of observations if we were to use it. Consequently, to keep the sample size as large as possible and still allow for comparability, we split-adjust the management guidance from the CIG file using the split-adjustment procedures used for the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the First Call file.[12] 4. Empirical Analysis. 4.1. Univariate Analysis. We present descriptive statistics for the guidance announcements, firm-specific characteristics and variables relating to analysts and stock returns in Table 1. We also include the results of two-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests for each variable. As noted before, we provide a list of variables and their definitions in the Appendix. We begin with forecast characteristic metrics designed to help us understand the differences, if any, in the specificity, timeliness, frequency and content of the earnings forecasts offered by the management of family and non-family firms. We present descriptive statistics first for the form of the forecast (an indicator of specificity) as measured by Forecast Form. As is well known, forecasts in the CIG database take one of several forms, which we code in the following manner: If the forecast is a specific earnings per share number (a point forecast), it is coded as 4; if it is a range of possible earnings per share numbers (a range forecast), it is coded as 3; if it consists of a one-sided directional forecast (either a maximum or minimum forthcoming earnings per share number), it is coded as 2; and if it contains no quantitative information (a qualitative forecast), it is coded as 1.[13] Note that our coding scheme is designed so that a higher value of Forecast Form indicates a mo re specific forecast. To further examine forecast specificity, we focus next on Forecast Width for range forecasts, which measures the difference between the maximum and minimum earnings per share figures offered in the forecast. (A narrower width indicates a more specific forecast.) In later tests, we include point forecasts as forecasts with a width of zero. To examine forecast timeliness, we use Forecast Horizon which is the number of calendar days from the management forecast date until the end of the quarter. More days in the forecast horizon indicate more timely forecasts. Finally, we form Annual Frequency and Quarterly Frequency variables, which measure the number of annual and quarterly management forecasts for each of our sample firms in the CIG database from 1994 through 2006, scaled by the total number of possible forecasting years (for Annual Frequency) or quarters (for Quarterly Frequency) to date. The descriptive statistics and statistical tests for Forecast Form provide initial evidence consistent with family firms issuing significantly more specific guidance than non-family firms. In particular, Forecast Form has slightly higher numerical values, on average, for family firms (p = .028, using the Wilcoxon test).[14] To further explore the potential differences, we examine the frequency distributions of the forms that guidance takes, as presented in Figure 1. As is obvious from the figure, range forecasts are by far the most common form of guidance for both family and non-family firms, making up nearly two-thirds of all guidance in our sample. Further, both family and non-family firms offer approximately 89% of their guidance as point or range forecasts. However, family firms offer relatively more of the more specific point forecasts (28% versus 23% for non-family firms) and relatively fewer of the less specific range forecasts (61% versus 66% for non-family firms).[15] Conver sely, guidance in the form of qualitative statements or minimum/maximum earnings per share numbers is unusual in our sample, regardless of the type of firm examined. The small number of qualitative forecasts in our First Call sample is inconsistent with Hutton et al. (2003) and Miller (2002), who find a substantially larger number of such forecasts when hand-collecting their samples than are included in the First Call database. (Anilowski et al. 2006 also suggest that First Call is more likely to include quantitative forecasts than qualitative ones.) This suggests that our sample is most likely incomplete and most representative when only quantitative forecasts are considered. For these reasons and because many tests require that we restrict attention to point and range forecasts, we will generally focus our discussion on point and range forecasts only. As just noted, range forecasts are the most common type of guidance in our sample. While it is clear from Figure 1 that non-family firms issue more range forecasts as guidance than family firms, Table 1 indicates that those issued by family firms are significantly narrower, as measured by Forecast Width (p = .000 for both the Wilcoxon and the two-sample t tests). This finding, when considered with the preliminary evidence of greater usage of point forecasts by family firms, suggests that guidance issued by family firms is generally more specific than that issued by non-family firms, consistent with H1. The next two forecast c Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms Quarterly Earnings Forecasting Decisions by Family Firms and the Market Reaction to Them Abstract We study the disclosure incentives for family firms by examining the characteristics of their quarterly earnings forecasts and analysts and investors responses to them. Forecasts offered before the fiscal quarter-end (guidance) by SP 500 family firms are generally more specific and timely than those offered by SP 500 non-family firms, particularly when they convey bad news or confirm analysts current expectations. Further, family firm guidance elicits a stronger response from both analysts and investors. While many of these differences largely disappear when the forecasts are offered after the quarter-end but before the earnings announcement itself (preannouncements), family firm preannouncements still tend to be more specific when they contain bad news. These more specific preannouncements also generate a significantly stronger response from analysts. Overall, our results suggest that large, visible family firms use manager-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transparent i nformation environment, and that these forecasts are likely to be most useful in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs when they are issued as guidance. Key Words: Management earnings forecasts, family firms, preannouncements, earnings warnings. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources listed in the text. Introduction. Family firms are generally defined as companies that are significantly influenced by founding family members or their descendants, through large shareholdings and/or operational control.[1] Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) report that family members hold approximately 18% of the equity of the family firms in the SP 500, on average, and control 45% of the CEO positions. In addition, family members often hold seats on the board of directors or are part of upper-level management in these firms (â€Å"Family Inc.†, Business Week, November 10, 2003). The structure inherent in these family firms gives rise to different agency problems than those in firms with much greater separation of ownership and control. Specifically, the family firm structure significantly limits the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control (often referred to as Type I agency problems) while exacerbating those that arise in the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (often referred to as Type II agency problems, see Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang 2006 and Anderson and Reeb 2003a). It is well known that the second type of agency problem can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure. However, it is also possible that reputational concerns may arise from the long-term nature of family members investment in their firm, mitigating this problem and reducing the need for more frequent and transparent disclosure (Wang 2006). The purpose of this paper is to add to our understanding of these competing incentives for differential disclosure by examining the characteristics of quarterly earnings forecasts issued by the management of family firms and the response of sell-side analysts and investors to them. Recent accounting research that examines mandatory financial disclosures by family firms suggests that reputational concerns alone may not be sufficient: Characteristics of family firms mandatory financial reports are consistent with their being used to mitigate the agency problem between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) show that large family firms offer higher quality financial reports as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals, greater ability of earnings to predict cash flows and larger earnings response coefficients. In addition, Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms in the SP 500 are more likely to voluntarily issue earnings forec asts during periods of earnings declines. However, they also find that family firms are less forthcoming in their disclosures about corporate governance. In a paper that was written concurrently with ours, Chen et al. (2007) study the frequency of voluntary disclosures (earnings and non-earnings forecasts and conference calls) from a larger sample of firms that includes the SP 500, SP MidCap 400 and SP SmallCap 600 in the five years before the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). They also find that family firms are more likely to issue bad-news earnings warnings but overall make fewer forward-looking disclosures than non-family firms, and conclude that their results are consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon and better monitoring of management, characteristics that obviate the need for greater disclosure. This paper contributes to the growing literature on the disclosures of family firms by studying one of the most informative and common types of voluntary financial disclosures—the companys own forecasts of its quarterly earnings per share—and sell-side analysts and investors responses to them. More specifically, we examine the characteristics of these disclosures (forecast specificity, surprise and accuracy), and the impact they have on important market indicators—professional analysts earnings estimates and stock prices. Thus, our analysis is designed to provide additional evidence on the relation between ownership structure and the quality of the firms information environment and, in particular, complements the existing empirical evidence on the characteristics and informativenesss of mandatory financial disclosures made by family and non-family firms (Ali et al. 2007 and Wang 2006). As noted above, we focus on a particular type of voluntary disclosure, managements forecasts of quarterly earnings per share, and do so for two reasons. First, prior research indicates that these forecasts are highly value-relevant—and more value-relevant than management forecasts of annual earnings per share (Pownall et al. 1993, Baginski and Hassell 1997). As a result, we believe that the quarterly forecasts are particularly well-suited for examining the different incentives family and non-family firms face in their attempts to control Type I and II agency problems, respectively. For example, higher quality forecasting by family firms (in terms of their forecasts being more specific, timely and accurate) is consistent with such firms creating a more transparent information environment and reducing a potentially severe Type II agency problem. Second, we are able to use a non-stock-price measure of the news in these management forecasts in our empirical work, which allows us t o more effectively analyze the markets perception of the differential information content in the forecasts made by family and non-family firms.[2] We also separate our sample of forecasts into guidance (i.e., forecasts made prior to the end of the quarter) and preannouncements (i.e., forecasts made after the quarter ends but before earnings are released). We do this because the forecast horizon associated with preannouncements is very short, sometimes a matter of two or three weeks, and because much of the uncertainty regarding the forthcoming earnings number is resolved by the fiscal quarter end for most, if not all, firms, regardless of whether or not they are controlled by a family. Thus, the Type II agency problem in family firms, if it dominates the Type I agency problem, is more likely to be mitigated through the provision of guidance than preannouncements. This leads us to hypothesize that the characteristics of guidance, but not preannouncements, are systematically related t o family-firm status, and that analysts and investors will react differently to the guidance, but not to preannouncements, issued by family firms, holding all else constant.[3] We test our hypotheses on the quarterly earnings forecasts made between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 index, as identified by Business Week (November 10, 2003) and contained in the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. There are two aspects of our sample that should be highlighted. First, our sample firms are among the largest, most stable and most visible in the U.S. As a result, our results may not generalize to smaller, less visible family firms such as those included in Chen et al.s (2007) sample. Second, our sample period spans the implementation of Reg FD. Thus, we provide evidence that complements the pre-Reg-FD evidence in Chen et al. (2007) and the limited post-Reg-FD evidence in Ali et al. (2007). The results of our empirical tests generally indicate that the guidance provided by family firms is of higher quality than that provided by non-family firms. In particular, after controlling for other influencing factors, we find that the family firms in our sample provide significantly more specific guidance (in terms of forecast form and narrowness of forecast range) than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news or offering confirmatory guidance. We also find that family firms use guidance to make smaller average adjustments to the markets estimate of the upcoming quarterly earnings than non-family firms, especially when conveying bad news. This is consistent with their being more timely in offering corrections to analysts estimates. More importantly, we find some evidence of a stronger and quicker response by analysts (as measured by the number of subsequent earnings estimate revisions and the speed with which they occur) to the guidance issued by family firms, and str ong evidence of a significantly greater investor response (as measured by announcement-period abnormal stock returns) to the guidance issued by family firms. These findings, taken together, indicate that guidance is more informative and more useful to the market when it is issued by a family firm. They are also consistent with family firms using guidance to create a more transparent information environment, which therefore, complements the finding of higher quality financial reporting by family firms in Ali et al (2007) and Wang (2006). Consistent with our expectations, we find little evidence of differences in the characteristics of preannouncements issued by family and non-family firms, although there is some (weak) evidence of family-firm preannouncements being more specific when they contain bad news.[4] Also consistent with our expectations, we find no evidence of a differential stock price response to preannouncements made by family and non-family firms, although we do find that analysts response more strongly to family-firm preannouncements, especially when they contain bad news. These results, when considered with the guidance results discussed above, suggest that family firms produce higher quality earnings forecasts than non-family firms, particularly when they are offered as guidance or contain bad news, and that their guidance is more informative and useful to investors and analysts. Thus, our paper provides evidence of family firms using management-generated earnings forecasts to create a more transpare nt information environment. Our paper contributes to two bodies of research: the growing literature on disclosures by family firms, as noted before, and the established literature on management forecasts. While our paper is most closely related to Ali et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006), who examine the mandatory financial disclosures of family firms and the frequency of their voluntary disclosures, we also complement Anderson et al.s (2006) analysis of other dimensions of disclosure transparency. Anderson et al. (2006) find that family firms are significantly more opaque than non-family firms as measured by a summary statistic that captures the effects of trading volume, the bid-ask spread, analyst following and analyst forecast errors. Taken together, the evidence in Anderson et al. (2006) and our paper suggest that certain types of transparent disclosures appear to be better suited than others to mitigating the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling owners. The literature on management forecasts is more mature and, as a result, guides much of the structure for our analysis. Consequently, we follow prior work by Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Baginski and Hassell (1990, 1997), Bamber and Cheon (1998), Baginski et al. (2002, 2004), Ajinkya et al. (2005) and others, in designing our tests. In a recent paper, Hirst et al. (2007) provide a review of this literature and propose a framework for continued research in this area. They observe that choices concerning the characteristics of management earnings forecasts are not yet well understood and suggest that additional work addressing this issue is needed. Our contribution to the literature on management forecasts is to analyze the differential impact of Type I and Type II agency problems on the characteristics of management earnings forecasts provided by family and non-family firms, including the time of their release, as well as the market and analyst reactions to them. Thus, we add to the initia l evidence on the underlying reasons for providing management forecasts in different forms and with different specificity—and on their impact of the stock prices of family and non-family firms. Finally, our results on confirmatory guidance support and extend the results in Clement et al. (2003). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review of the relevant literature and develop hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our sample and data, and in Section 4, we present the empirical tests. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5. 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development Family firms are defined in the academic literature as firms in which founders or their descendants exercise control either because they are significant shareholders or because they are part of top management or the board of directors. Not only are family firms common in Europe and Asia (see, for example, LaPorta et al. 1999, Claessens et al, 2000, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001 and Faccio and Lang 2002), they comprise approximately one-third of the SP 500 in the U.S. (Anderson and Reeb 2003a).[5] Further, family members ownership stakes are significant: Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report that in the SP 500, family members hold, on average, 18% of the voting shares in their companies. A large literature on family firms has recently developed in accounting and finance, much of it focused on the differences in agency problems that arise in family and non-family firms.[6] Of particular interest to us are the agency problems arising from (1) the separation of ownership and control, and (2) the conflict between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.[7] The papers that examine these conflicts generally argue that (1), referred to as the â€Å"Type I† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), is less important for family firms because of the unusually close alignment of owners and management in those firms when compared to non-family firms (e.g., Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2007, Wang (2006).[8] They also argue that the tight linkage between some owners and control in family firms exacerbates (2), referred to as the â€Å"Type II† agency problem in Ali et al. (2007), in which family members transfer wealth to themselves to the detriment of other sharehol ders. As is well known, such agency problems can be partially mitigated by frequent and transparent disclosure, suggesting that family firms are more likely to offer a variety of mandatory and voluntary disclosures whose implications are clearer to market participants.[9] In contrast, Wang (2006) suggests that family firms may not face a more severe Type II agency problem if the long-term nature of their investment is well understood by the market. In essence, he argues that long-term investors are less likely to exploit agency problems for short-term gain—thus, family firms may not need to resort to greater frequency or transparency of disclosures. Ali et al. (2007) and Wang (2006) empirically test these competing predictions by comparing aspects of the accounting disclosures made by family and non-family firms. Both find that earnings quality is higher for family firms, especially when a founder CEO is in place. Thus, both provide some evidence consistent with family firms mitigating their Type II agency problems—or responding to the demands of the users of financial statements—with higher quality disclosures. More specifically, Ali et al. (2007) document lower discretionary accruals and greater earnings persistence for SP 500 family firms compared to SP 500 non-family firms. In addition, they find that the association between earnings and stock returns is higher for the family firms. Similarly, Wang (2006) finds that SP 500 founding family firms have lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness and less persistence in transitory loss components in earnings. He extends this analysis by considering th e effect of the percentage of common stock owned by family members on the magnitude of the Type II agency problem. Interestingly, he finds that the relation is nonlinear: When founding family ownership is above (approximately) 60%, the quality of the earnings reported by non-family firms exceeds that of family firms. Ali et al. (2007) also provide some evidence inconsistent with family firms mitigating their more severe Type II agency problem through the use of disclosures: They observe that family firms are less forthcoming about their corporate governance practices and that when they employ a dual class share structure, earnings quality is lower relative to when they do not have such a structure. Another method for testing whether family firms mitigate the potentially more severe Type II agency costs—or respond to financial statement users demand for high quality accounting information—through greater frequency and transparency of disclosures is to examine the issuance of management earnings forecasts by family and non-family firms. Complicating this is the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) which suggests that the use of earnings warnings will vary positively with the litigation risk that the firm faces, and inversely with the severity of the firms Type I agency problem (Ali et al. 2007). However, since the Type II agency problem is expected to be more severe and the Type I agency problem less severe in family firms (Ali et al. 2007), family firms would be expected to provide management forecasts to mitigate both types of agency problems, holding litigation risk constant. The relative severity of the Type II agency problem further suggests that family firms earnings forecasts will be of higher quality (i.e., more specific, timely and accurate), and that market participants (e.g., sell-side analysts and investors) will respond more strongly to them. Ali et al. (2007) provide initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis when they observe that family firms are more likely to provide earnings warnings (i.e., guidance that warns of a forthcoming earnings decline) than non-family firms. In a more recent paper, however, Chen et al. (2007) provide evidence that family firms make fewer voluntary disclosures than non-family firms. They collect ownership and founding family information from several sources to identify family firms in the SP 1500 and find that family firms are (1) 8.1% less likely to provide management forecasts of all kinds (i.e., annual and quarterly earnings, revenues, cash flows, etc.), and (2) less likely to hold conference calls as well. They also find, however, that family firms are more likely than non-family firms to issue bad-news earnings warnings. Chen et al. (2007) conclude that these results, when considered collectively, indicate that family firms owners prefer less disclosure because of their long investmen t horizon and effective monitoring of managers, but that their concern with reducing litigation costs results in an increased likelihood of bad news earnings warnings. In this paper, we hope to add to our understanding of the relative importance of the competing incentives studied in previous work by examining (1) the characteristics of management forecasts of quarterly earnings per share (both guidance, which is offered prior to the end of the quarter, and preannouncements, which are offered after quarter-end but before the actual earnings announcement) of family and non-family firms, and (2) the response of sell-side analysts and investors to those forecasts. In particular, we hope to add to our understanding of the disclosure choices of family firms by determining whether their own earnings forecasts are more specific, timely and accurate, consistent with family firms providing higher quality disclosures—and whether those forecasts are viewed as being of higher quality by market participants as measured by their response to the disclosure. We also separate our forecasts into guidance and preannouncements under the assumption that any fami ly-firm effect will be more likely to be observed in guidance because of the longer horizon over which the forecasts can be made. More specifically, in the case of preannouncements, there is a very short forecast horizon (e.g., a few weeks beyond the end of the quarter) and so we do not expect large differences in timeliness of the preannouncements between family and non-family firms. Further, because much of the uncertainty about the earnings numbers is resolved by quarter-end, differences in the specificity of preannouncements between family and non-family firms, if any, are likely to be small. Finally, motives to provide preannouncements are likely to be dominated by the litigation argument proposed by Skinner (1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995).[10] If this is the case, differences in characteristics of voluntary earnings forecasts, and in market participants responses to them, are likely to be concentrated in guidance. As in prior research, we recognize that because of competing forces, whether the guidance of family firms is of higher quality is an empirical question. Thus, our formal hypotheses regarding guidance are non-directional, as in Chen et al. (2007) and Wang (2006): H1: The specificity, timeliness and content of earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the firm is classified as a family firm. H2: Sell-side analysts and investors responses to earnings guidance is systematically related to whether the issuing firm is classified as a family firm. 3. Sample and Data. Our sample is comprised of 4,130 management quarterly earnings guidance announcements issued between 1998 and 2006 by the family and non-family firms in the SP 500 as identified by Business Week in its November 10, 2003, issue. Business Week defines a family firm as â€Å"†¦any company where founders or descendants continue to hold positions in top management, on the board, or among the companys shareholders.† To identify family firms, Business Week relies on the methodology developed by Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b) as well as their advice and the help of Spencer Stuart as they â€Å"†¦examined regulatory filings, company Web sites and corporate histories† to ensure significant family involvement in the company. (For details, see â€Å"Defining Family,† Business Week, November 10, 2003, p. 111.) Before proceeding, we want to highlight certain aspects of our sample. First, because the Business Week classification pertains to only SP 500 firms, the fi rms in our sample are among the largest, most stable and most profitable companies in the U.S. As a result, our findings might not extend to mid- or small-cap companies. Second, our reliance on the Business Week classification means that we do not form a new sample of family and non-family firms each year. However, as Ali et al. (2007) note, family firm status is sticky, and thus misclassifications due to changing firm status will most likely bias against our finding significant results. Third, Business Weeks classification scheme is designed to identify firms that are controlled by a family without relying on a single proxy for control, such as ownership share. As a result, it captures features of family firms, beyond simply having large blockholders, that are likely to exacerbate Type II agency problems. Fourth, by using Business Weeks classification, which is based on the â€Å"standard† developed by Anderson and Reeb, our results are more easily compared to many prior res ults. Finally, while we recognize that Business Week might not accurately classify every firm, both types of classification errors (i.e., misclassifying firms without significant family control as family firms, and misclassifying firms with significant family control as non-family firms) limit our ability to detect differences in the forecasts of family and non-family firms and therefore bias against our finding significant results. We form our sample by first gathering all forecasts of quarter-ahead earnings made between 1998 and 2006 by the SP 500 as of June 2003 from the First Call Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database. We lose 1,994 of the original 7,694 observations because of unavailability of (1) necessary Compustat and CRSP data, (2) actual earnings per share and other analyst forecast data from First Call, and (3) observations with multiple actual earnings per share numbers. After deleting stale forecasts (those made before the prior quarters earnings announcement date), we retain all â€Å"guidance† observations (forecasts made at the same time as or after the prior earnings announcement and at or before the quarter end, N = 4,332). We trim the sample to mitigate the effect of outliers as follows. First, we eliminate the top and bottom one-half percent of the management forecast errors in each sample, the top and bottom one-half percent of the forecast surprises in each sample, the top and bott om one-half percent of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns in each sample and finally, the top and bottom one-half percent of return volatility ratios in each sample—and retain the union of the remaining observations. (These variables are defined in the Appendix and will be discussed in detail later.) We then eliminate 62 firm quarter observations whose stock price is less than $5 as of the beginning of the quarter. This results in a final sample of 4,130 guidance announcements. One-hundred-and-forty six of the 177 family firms identified by Business Week (82.5%) provide guidance during our sample period as compared to 240 of the 323 non-family firms in the SP 500 (74.3%). [11] Before turning to the empirical analysis, we note for the reader that the management guidance we gather from the CIG database is not split-adjusted whereas the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the main First Call file are (further, they are rounded to the nearest penny). An I/B/E/S unadjusted data file is available but unfortunately, we would lose a significant number of observations if we were to use it. Consequently, to keep the sample size as large as possible and still allow for comparability, we split-adjust the management guidance from the CIG file using the split-adjustment procedures used for the analysts estimates and reported earnings per share in the First Call file.[12] 4. Empirical Analysis. 4.1. Univariate Analysis. We present descriptive statistics for the guidance announcements, firm-specific characteristics and variables relating to analysts and stock returns in Table 1. We also include the results of two-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests for each variable. As noted before, we provide a list of variables and their definitions in the Appendix. We begin with forecast characteristic metrics designed to help us understand the differences, if any, in the specificity, timeliness, frequency and content of the earnings forecasts offered by the management of family and non-family firms. We present descriptive statistics first for the form of the forecast (an indicator of specificity) as measured by Forecast Form. As is well known, forecasts in the CIG database take one of several forms, which we code in the following manner: If the forecast is a specific earnings per share number (a point forecast), it is coded as 4; if it is a range of possible earnings per share numbers (a range forecast), it is coded as 3; if it consists of a one-sided directional forecast (either a maximum or minimum forthcoming earnings per share number), it is coded as 2; and if it contains no quantitative information (a qualitative forecast), it is coded as 1.[13] Note that our coding scheme is designed so that a higher value of Forecast Form indicates a mo re specific forecast. To further examine forecast specificity, we focus next on Forecast Width for range forecasts, which measures the difference between the maximum and minimum earnings per share figures offered in the forecast. (A narrower width indicates a more specific forecast.) In later tests, we include point forecasts as forecasts with a width of zero. To examine forecast timeliness, we use Forecast Horizon which is the number of calendar days from the management forecast date until the end of the quarter. More days in the forecast horizon indicate more timely forecasts. Finally, we form Annual Frequency and Quarterly Frequency variables, which measure the number of annual and quarterly management forecasts for each of our sample firms in the CIG database from 1994 through 2006, scaled by the total number of possible forecasting years (for Annual Frequency) or quarters (for Quarterly Frequency) to date. The descriptive statistics and statistical tests for Forecast Form provide initial evidence consistent with family firms issuing significantly more specific guidance than non-family firms. In particular, Forecast Form has slightly higher numerical values, on average, for family firms (p = .028, using the Wilcoxon test).[14] To further explore the potential differences, we examine the frequency distributions of the forms that guidance takes, as presented in Figure 1. As is obvious from the figure, range forecasts are by far the most common form of guidance for both family and non-family firms, making up nearly two-thirds of all guidance in our sample. Further, both family and non-family firms offer approximately 89% of their guidance as point or range forecasts. However, family firms offer relatively more of the more specific point forecasts (28% versus 23% for non-family firms) and relatively fewer of the less specific range forecasts (61% versus 66% for non-family firms).[15] Conver sely, guidance in the form of qualitative statements or minimum/maximum earnings per share numbers is unusual in our sample, regardless of the type of firm examined. The small number of qualitative forecasts in our First Call sample is inconsistent with Hutton et al. (2003) and Miller (2002), who find a substantially larger number of such forecasts when hand-collecting their samples than are included in the First Call database. (Anilowski et al. 2006 also suggest that First Call is more likely to include quantitative forecasts than qualitative ones.) This suggests that our sample is most likely incomplete and most representative when only quantitative forecasts are considered. For these reasons and because many tests require that we restrict attention to point and range forecasts, we will generally focus our discussion on point and range forecasts only. As just noted, range forecasts are the most common type of guidance in our sample. While it is clear from Figure 1 that non-family firms issue more range forecasts as guidance than family firms, Table 1 indicates that those issued by family firms are significantly narrower, as measured by Forecast Width (p = .000 for both the Wilcoxon and the two-sample t tests). This finding, when considered with the preliminary evidence of greater usage of point forecasts by family firms, suggests that guidance issued by family firms is generally more specific than that issued by non-family firms, consistent with H1. The next two forecast c

Grandpa Essay -- Personal Narrative Writing

Grandpa My grandpa was one of the most caring and understanding men that I have ever known. He always found a way to make us happy, whether he was dressing- up as Santa Claus, on Christmas Eve, or building us tree houses. His death greatly affected both my grandma and I. The shock of my grandpa’s death totally devastated me. I found out that my grandpa died one night after my mom picked my brother and I up from day care. We went over to our grandma’s house on a weeknight, which was unusual, because we always spent time with our grandparents on the weekends. When we got to our grandma’s house we saw that our dad and our aunt were sitting in the living room with our grandma. This was very unusual, because our dad lives in Prescott, and our aunt works on the other side of Phoenix from where my grandma lives. All three of them looked very somber. I was still pretty young, so I did not realize what was happening, and I asked where our grandpa was. The second I finished my question, dad started sobbing, and said â€Å"Son, grandpa is dead.† He said my grandpa died of a massive heart-attack at about three o’clock that morning. He said there was nothing that the paramedics could have done. I could see there was a spot of bl ood on the floor right where my grandpa died and the paramedics had tried to revive him to no avail. The truth hit me like a freight train, and I began to cry. I did not stop crying until I fell asleep at about two o’ clock the next morning. I did not know what ...

Project topics †Journal of Engineering Research and Studies Essay

Journal of Engineering Research and Studies E-ISSN0976-7916 Research Paper SEPARATION OF OIL AND PECTIN FROM ORANGE PEEL AND STUDY OF EFFECT OF pH OF EXTRACTING MEDIUM ON THE YIELD OF PECTIN Shekhar Pandharipande*a, Harshal Makodeb Address for Correspondence *a- Associate Professor, Department of Chemical Engineering, Laxminarayan Institute of Technology, Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University, Bharat Nagar, Amravati Road, Nagpur,India. b B. Tech student, Department of Chemical Engineering, Laxminarayan Institute of Technology, Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj Nagpur University, Bharat Nagar, Amravati Road, Nagpur, India. ABSTRACT An orange, specifically, the sweet orange (Citrus sinensis (L.)) is the most commonly grown tree fruit in the world. The present work addresses to the development of the part of the process needed for the extraction of value added products like orange oil and pectin from orange peel, which is the waste of orange juice processing industry. The outcome of the present work highlighted that the sweet orange peels are good source of orange oil and pectin and does have the potential to become important raw material for food processing industries. Two methods namely simple distillation & leaching have been explored for separation of oil from peels. The remains of cake in this part is further treated for isolation of pectin. It is found from the experimental observations that the peel source, for extraction of pectin, when taken after extracting orange oil through simple distillation gives higher yield than leaching residue. It is concluded that the process in which orange oil is first extracted using technique of simple distillation followed by acid extraction of pectin is most suitable for industrial production for isolation of pectin. These results demonstrate the successful extraction of orange oil and pectin, providing potential benefits for  industrial extraction of pectin from an economic and environmental point of view. KEYWORDS orange peel, pectin extraction, orange essential oil 1.1 INTRODUCTION An orange, specifically, the sweet orange (Citrus  sinensis (L.)) is the most commonly grown tree fruit  in the world. Orange trees are widely cultivated in  tropical and subtropical climates for the sweet fruit,  which is peeled or cut (to avoid the bitter rind) and  eaten whole, or processed to extract orange juice, &  also for the fragrant peel. Citrus fruits are at the top  not only in total production, but also in economic  value. The albedo is the main source of pectin. Pectin  includes all the esterified polygalacturonic acids at  different degree of neutralization. In the presence of  saccharine and small quantities of organic acids  (usually citric acid), pectins gelatinized, and this  property is exploited by the agrochemistry and  pharmaceutical industries for pectin isolation. Orange  essential oil is present in small ductless gland  contained in the peel of the orange fruits. The main  constituent of orange peel essential oil is d-limone ne  (present to the extent of at least 90 %), which is the  only hydrocarbon present. The d-limonene is  extracted from orange rinds or solids. The rinds and  pulp are sent to an evaporator and the d-limonene is  steamed out. It is widely known for its pleasant scent  and degreasing properties. d-limonene is currently  being used in many applications such as chlorinated  solvents replacements, hand cleaners and sewage  treatments. The orange processing industry can get a  complete makeover if due importance is given for  separation of useful ingredient from orange peel.  Researchers and Scientists have been working on the  separation of oil and pectin from orange peel and  reporting their findings in journals of repute. A brief  summary includes orange peel: organic waste or  energetic resource(1), Waste to wealth: Industrial raw  materials potential of peels of Nigerian sweet orange  (Citrus sinensis)(2), method of distilling a volatile  constituent from liquid mixture(3), Optimization of  pectin acid extraction from passion fruit peel  (Passiflora edulis flavicarpa) using response surface  methodology(4), Extraction and Qualitative Assessment of African Sweet Orange Seed Oil(5), JERS/Vol. III/ Issue II/April-June, 2012/06-09 Comparisons between different techniques for waterbased extraction of pectin from orange peels(6) , microwave-assisted Isolation of essential oil of  Cinnamomum iners Reinw. ex Bl.: Comparison with  Conventional hydrodistillation(7), Microwave-assisted  extraction of pectin from orange peel(8), microbial  production of pectin from Citrus peel(9), Optimization  of Pectin Extraction from Peel of Dragon Fruit  (Hylocereus polyrhizus)(10), Determining the Yield  and Quality of Pectin from Fresh Peel & Pectin  Pomace(11) and Microbial Production of Pectin from  Citrus Peel(12) . The present work (13) explored the possibility of  separation of essential oils and pectin from the  orange peels. Nagpur is major orange producing  centre in the subcontinent and even recognised in the  name of oranges as, Orange city. 1.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS: The present work is divided into following parts: I. Separation of oil from peels. a) Using the method of simple distillation b) Using ethanol as solvent in the method of leaching II. Extraction of pectin from oil peels a) From fresh peels, the leftover b) From dried cake remained after simple distillation and leaching as in part I 1.2.1 Separation of oil from peels: Raw Material: The raw material taken under examination for the extraction of orange oil (d-limonene) and pectin is orange peel. Orange peels are removed from fresh oranges which are procured from local market and which were harvested in the month of December 2011 to January 2012. Methods: Simple distillation is employed for removal of essential oil from orange peel. Dried and fined ground orange peel powder is added with known quantity of water which is simple distilled off for approximately one hour. The solid remains of the residue are dried to obtain the dry cake. The distillate Journal of Engineering Research and Studies E-ISSN0976-7916 resulted in to two phases, oil and water. Two phases  are separated and orange oil is obtained. For 350 gm  of orange powder taken, 8 ml of oil and 126.3 gm of  dried cake is obtained. The method of leaching is also explored for removal  of oil from peels. 380 gm of fresh orange peel are extracted with 225 ml of ethanol. After adequate  contacting, two phases, solid and liquid are separated,  198 gm of wet slurry resulted into 150 gm of dry  cake. However oil could not be recovered following  this method. The dried cake obtained is further  treated for separation of pectin in next part of present  work.  1.2.2 Extraction of pectin from orange peels:  The objective of this part of work is extraction and  isolation of pectin from fresh orange peel sample and  the dry cake sample left after extraction of oil using  simple distillation as in part I. The objective includes  the study of the effect of pH of the medium on the  yield of pectin extracted. The process flow chart is as shown in the figure 1. Table no 1: Experimental observations of yield of pectin at different pH Fig no 1: Process flow chart for extraction of pectin from orange peel sample Citric acid in distilled water solutions of desired pH  values 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are prepared. Orange peel samples weighing 10 gm each are dipped in to the  solution and heated at 800C for 10 minutes. After  cooling the solution, it is filtered using cloth filter  and Whatman filter paper under vacuum. Ethanol is  added to the filtered solution to facilitate filtration of  pectin. The solution is filtered using fine filter cloth  or centrifuge at 8000 rpm for 15 min at 100C to  separate jelly pectin which is dried under vacuum at  500C and -100 mmHg gauge for two hours. Dried  pectin is thus obtained. The observations are given in  table no 1.  Yield % of pectin is based on the gram of peel sample taken, and is calculated by formula as given below; Fig no 2: Pectin yield at different pH of extracting medium 1.2.2.1: Comparison of yield of pectin from the dry cake residue left after simple distillation and leaching: Same procedure is applied for separation of pectin in  this part of present work, as followed in part 1.2.2.the  observations are tabulated in table 2 & pictorial  details & output of process are depicted in fig 3. Table no 2: Experimental observations of  comparison of yield of pectin from the dry cake  residue left after simple distillation and leaching  where Ypec (%) is the extracted pectin yield in per cent (%), P is the amount of dry pectin in g and Bi is the initial amount of orange peel in gram. Results and discussion: The maximum yield of pectin is obtained at   extraction medium pH of 1. However negligible yield  is obtained at pH of 4 and 5 as can be seen from  graph plotted between pectin yield % obtained for  various values of pH of medium as shown in fig 2. JERS/Vol. III/ Issue II/April-June, 2012/06-09 Journal of Engineering Research and Studies Result and discussion: The yield of pectin obtained is highest in turbid  extract, but this might be due to some suspended  impurities present in the extract. The maximum  overall yield of the pectin is obtained from orange  peel residue sample through simple distillation. Therefore, in the process of orange oil and pectin  extraction from orange peel, it is recommended on  basis of results obtained, that to first extract oil using  simple distillation and then isolate pectin with acid  hydrolysis technique. 1.3 CONCLUSION Nagpur region is well known in central Asia as  largest orange producing region. It is also known as  the California of India, producing excellent quality  oranges in large number. Though it has great  production of oranges, the downstream processing  and value added product manufacturing technology is  not yet developed. The present work is dedicated for E-ISSN0976-7916 the development of the part of the process technology  needed for the extraction of value added products i.e.  orange oil and pectin from orange peel, which is the  waste of orange juice processing industry. The  present work revealed that the sweet orange peels are  good source of orange oil and pectin and does have  the potential to become important raw material for  food processing industries. It is found from the  experimentation that the peel source, for extraction of  pectin, when taken after extracting orange oil through  simple distillation gives higher yield than leaching  residue. So it can be concluded that the process in  which orange oil is first extracted using technique of  simple distillation followed by acid extraction of  pectin is most suitable for industrial production. These results demonstrate the successful extraction of  orange oil and pectin, providing potential benefits for  industrial extraction of pectin from an economic and  environmental point of view. Fig no 3: Pictorial presentation of the process for comparison of yield of pectin from the dry cake residue left after simple distillation and leaching Amboni. (2009). optimisation of pectin acid extraction REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. Martà ­n M.A, Siles J.A.1, El Bari H, Chica A. F, Università © Ibn Tofail. Facultà © dos Sciences. Kenitra (Maroc) .(2008). Orange Peel: Organic Waste or Energetic Resource? Tobias I. Ndubuisi Ezejiofor, N. V. Eke, R. I. Okechukwu, R. N. Nwoguikpe and C. M. Duru. (2011) Waste to wealth: Industrial raw materials potential of peels of Nigerian sweet orange (Citrus sinensis). African Journal of Biotechnology Vol. 10(33), pp. 6257-6264. Gorden P. Gerow, Davenport, Fla.(1982). Method Of Distilling A Volatile Constituent From Liquid Mixture. United States Patent, 4,326,926. Erika Kliemann, Karina Nunes de Simas, Edna R. Amante, Elane Schwinden Prudeˆncio, Reinaldo F. Teo ´ filo, Ma ´ rcia M. C. Ferreira & Renata D. M. C. JERS/Vol. III/ Issue II/April-June, 2012/06-09 5. 6. 7. from passion fruit peel (Passiflora edulis flavicarpa) using response surface methodology. International Journal of Food Science and Technology, 44, 476–483. Nwobi BE, Ofoegbu O & O B Adesina. (2006). Extraction And Qualitative Assessment Of African Sweet Orange Seed Oil. African Journal of food agriculture nutrition and development. Vol. 6 ISSN 1684-5374. S. Yeoh, J. Shi, T.A.G. Langrish. (2008). Comparisons between different techniques for water-based extraction of pectin from orange peels. Elsevier, Desalination 218, 229–237. Weerachai Phutdhawong, Rungthip Kawaree, Samart Sanjaiya, Waya Sengpracha & Duang Buddhasukh.(2007). Microwave-Assisted Isolation of Essential oil of innamomum iners Reinw. ex Bl.: Journal of Engineering Research and Studies Comparison with Conventional Hydrodistillation. Molecules ISSN 1420-3049 8. Zheng Jie, Yang Ting, Wu Qiang, Li Jing, Wang YaNa. (2009). Microwave-assisted Extraction of Pectin from Orange Peel. Vol. 30, No. 20, p. 134-137. 9. P.Y. Tang, C.J. Wong and K.K. Woo. (2011). Optimization of Pectin Extraction from Peel of Dragon Fruit (Hylocereus polyrhizus). Asian Journal of Biological Sciences, ISSN 1996-3351, Knowledgia Review, Malaysia, 4 (2): 189-195. 10. P. G. Crandall, R. J. Braddock, and A. H. Rouse. (1978). Determining The Yield And Quality Of Pectin From Fresh Peel And Pectin Pomace. Proc. Fla. State Hort. Soc. 91:109-111. 11. Takuo Sakai & Minoru Okushima. (1998). Microbial Production of Pectin from Citrus Peel.Applied and Environmental Microbiology, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 908912. 12. Harshal Makode (2012).Project report submitted for B Tech to Rashtrasant Tukadoji Maharaj Nagpur University,Nagpur. JERS/Vol. III/ Issue II/April-June, 2012/06-09 E-ISSN0976-7916

Why Did Hatshepsut Become King Why Stay in Power

In about 1473 BCE, a woman, Hatshepsut, took the unprecedented step of becoming king of Egypt with full kingship powers and a male identity. She thus displaced, for about two decades, her stepson and nephew Thutmose III, assumed heir of her husband. And she did this in a time of relative peace and considerable economic prosperity and stability in Egypt; most women who ruled as regents or solely did so in chaotic times. Heres a summary of some of the current thinking about Hatshepsuts motivations for becoming—and remaining—the Pharaoh of Egypt. Initial Rule as Regent: A Tradition Hatshepsuts initial rule was as the regent for her stepson, and though she was depicted as a senior ruler and he as the junior partner in their rule, she did not initially take on full kingship. In ruling as a regent, protecting the throne for her husbands heir, she was following in some recent footsteps.  Other women of the 18th Dynasty had ruled  in that relationship. The Trouble With Titles Women rulers before Hatshepsut had ruled as the mother of the next king. But Hatshepsuts regency was a bit different, and thus her legitimacy in ruling may not have been quite so clear. For kings of ancient Egypt, we often use the title Pharaoh—a word derived from an Egyptian word that came to be used for individuals only with the New Kingdom, about the time of Thutmose III. The meaning of the word is Great House and earlier may have referred to the government or, perhaps, the royal palace. The more generic king is probably more accurate a title for describing the royal rulers of ancient Egypt. But later usage has made the title Pharaoh common for any king of Egypt. No Queens? Theres no word in ancient Egypt equivalent to the English word queen—that is, a female equivalent of king. In English, its customary to use the word queen not just for women who ruled as fully equivalent of kings, but also for the  consorts of kings. In ancient Egypt, and more to the point in the Eighteenth Dynasty, the titles of consorts of kings include such titles as Kings Wife or Kings Great Wife. If she was eligible, she might also be designated Kings Daughter, Kings Mother, or Kings Sister. Gods Wife The Kings Great Wife might also be called Gods Wife, probably referring to the wifes religious role. With the New Kingdom, the god Amun became central, and several kings (including Hatshepsut) depicted themselves as divinely conceived by the god Amun, coming to the Great Wife of their (earthly) father in the guise of that father. The disguise would have protected the wife from allegations of adultery—one of the most serious offenses against marriage in ancient Egypt. At the same time, the divine parent story let people know that the new King had been chosen to rule, even from conception, by the god Amun. The first kings wives to be named as Gods Wife were Ahhotep and Ahmos-Nefertari. Ahhotep was the mother of the founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Ahmose I, and the sister/wife of Ahmose I, Ahmos-Nefertari. Ahhotep I was the daughter of the previous king, Taa I, and wife of her brother, Taa II. The title Gods Wife has been found on her coffin, so it may not have been used during her lifetime. Inscriptions have been found as well naming Ahmos-Nefertari as Gods Wife. Ahmos-Nefertari was the daughter of Ahmos I and Ahhotep, and wife of Amenhotep I. The title Gods Wife was used later for other Great Wives, including Hatshepsut. It was also used for her daughter, Neferure, who apparently used it when performing in religious rites alongside her mother Hatshepsut after Hatshepsut had assumed the power, title, and image of a male king. The title fell largely out of use by the middle of the Eighteenth Dynasty. No Title for Regent? There was also no word in ancient Egyptian for regent. When women earlier in the Eighteenth Dynasty ruled for their sons during their sons minority, they were described with the title Kings Mother. Hatshepsuts Title Problem With Hatshepsut, the title Kings Mother would have been problematic. Her husband, Thutmose II, died when his only known surviving son was probably quite young. Thutmose IIIs mother was a minor, presumably non-royal wife named Isis. Isis had the title, Kings Mother. Hatshepsut, as the Kings Great Wife, half-sister to her husband, Thutmose II, had more claim on royal descent than Thutmose IIIs mother, Isis. Hatshepsut was the one chosen to be regent. But Thutmose III was her stepson and nephew. Hatshepsut had titles of Kings Daughter, Kings Sister, Kings Great Wife, and Gods Wife—but she was not Kings Mother. This may be part of the reason it became—or seemed at the time—necessary for Hatshepsut to take another title, one unprecedented for a Kings Wife: King. Ironically, by taking the title King, Hatshepsut may also have made it difficult for her successors to carry on any public memory of her co-rule with or regency for Thutmose III. Wicked Stepmother Theory Older versions of Hatshepsuts  story assume that Hatshepsut seized power and ruled as a wicked stepmother, and that her stepson and successor got his revenge after her death by removing her memory from history. Is this what happened? Soon after evidence of the existence of a female pharaoh,  Hatshepsut, was recovered in the 19th century, archaeologists figured out that Hatshepsut had ruled as a king, and not just regent for her stepson and nephew, Thutmose III;someone, presumably Thutmose III, had defaced inscriptions and statues, attempting apparently to remove evidence of such rule; andHatshepsut had an unusually close relationship with a commoner, Senenmut. The conclusion many drew was whats now referred to as the wicked stepmother story. Hatshepsut was assumed to have taken advantage of the true heirs infancy or youth, and seized power from him. Hatshepsut was also assumed to have ruled alongside Senenmet, or at least with his support, and to have taken him as her lover. As soon as Hatshepsut died, in this story, Thutmose III was free to exercise his own power. Out of hatred and resentment, he carried out a vicious attempt to erase her memory from history. Questioning the Story Although traces of this story can still be found in many reference sources, especially older ones, the wicked stepmother story eventually became suspect. New archaeological finds—and, perhaps, changing cultural assumptions in our own world that influenced assumptions of Egyptologists—led to serious questioning of the Hatshepsut the wicked stepmother myth. Selective Removal of Images It became apparent that the campaign to remove Hatshepsuts inscriptions had been selective. Images or names of Hatshepsut as queen or priestess were far less likely to be defaced than images or names of Hatshepsut as a king. Images unlikely to be seen by the public were far less likely to be attacked than those that were obvious. Removal Was Not Immediate It also became apparent that the campaign didnt happen immediately after Hatshepsut died and Thutmose III became sole ruler. One would expect a hate-filled campaign rooted in deep resentment would take place more quickly. It was thought that the wall around the bottom of Hatshepsuts obelisks was built by Thutmose III to cover images of Hatshepsut. The date of the wall was put at about twenty years after Hatshepsuts death. Since images on the lower covered part of the obelisks werent defaced and represented Hatshepsut as king, this led to the conclusion that it took at least twenty years for Thutmose III to get around to this literal cover-up of Hatshepsuts kingship. At least one group, a French archaeology team, conclude that Hatshepsut herself had the wall built. Does that mean that Thutmose IIIs campaign could have been immediate? No—because new evidence shows statues with cartouches naming Hatshepsut as king were built over about ten years into Thutmose IIIs sole reign. So, today, Egyptologists generally conclude that Thutmose III took at least ten to twenty years to get around to removing the Hatshepsut-as-king evidence. Thutmose III Not Idle To read some of the older sources, youd think Thutmose III was idle and inactive until after the death of his wicked stepmother. It was commonly reported that  after  Hatshepsuts death, Thutmose III embarked on a series of military campaigns. The implication: that Thutmose III was powerless while Hatshepsut lived, but that he was so militarily successful afterwards that some have called him the Napoleon of Egypt. Now, evidence has been interpreted to show that, after Thutmose III was old enough, and before Hatshepsuts death, he became head of Hatshepsuts army, and actually carried out several military campaigns. This means that its highly unlikely that Hatshepsut held Thutmose III as a virtual prisoner, helpless until her death to take power. In fact, as head of the army, he was in a position to seize power and depose his stepmother during her lifetime, if he were—as the wicked stepmother story would have it—festering with resentment and hate. Hatshepsut and the Egyptian Theology of Kingship When Hatshepsut took power as king, she did so in a context of religious beliefs. We might call this mythology today, but to the ancient Egyptian, the identification of the king with certain deities and powers was essential for the security of the unified Egypt. Among these deities were Horus  and Osiris. In ancient Egypt, including in the time of the Eighteenth Dynasty and  Hatshepsut, the kings role was tied up with theology—with beliefs about the gods and religion. By the time of the Eighteenth Dynasty, the king (pharaoh) was identified with three separate creation myths, all of which featured a male exercising generative creative power. As with many other religions, this identification of the king with generativity was assumed to be the foundation of the generativity of the land. The kings power, in other words, was believed to be at the base of Egypts survival, thriving, strength, stability, and prosperity. Ancient Egypt was comfortable with human/divinity duality—with the idea that someone could be both human and divine. A king had both a human name and a crown name—not to mention a Horus name, a golden Horus name, and others. Kings played parts in the rituals—but to the Egyptians, the identification of the person and the god was real, not play. Kings took on the identity with different gods at different times, without diminishing the power and truth of the identification within the Egyptian theology. Religious rituals involving the king were believed to recreate the land. When a king died and the male heir was too young to take the role of the creative male gods in the rituals, the question was opened: whether Egypt could prosper and be stable during this time. One wonders if the reverse might also be true: if Egypt turned out to be strong and stable and prosperous without those male-king-centered rituals, might not there be questions about whether the king was necessary? Whether the temple and its rituals were necessary? Hatshepsut began to exercise a co-rulership with her stepson and nephew, Thutmose III. If she were to adequately protect Egypts strength and power for the time when Thutmose III would be old enough to exercise power on his own, it may have been deemed necessary—by Hatsepsut? the priests? the court?—for Hatshepsut to take on these religious roles. It may have been deemed more dangerous to neglect those rites than to have Hatshepsut assume the maleness that was assumed to be needed to perform them properly. Once Hatshepsut took the step of becoming fully king, she went to great lengths to justify that this was the right thing to do—that all was right with the universe even with a woman taking on a male and kingly role. Heiress Theory Many of the royal kings (pharaohs) of ancient Egypt were married to their sisters or half-sisters. Many kings who were not themselves the son of a king, were married to the daughter or sister of a king. This has led some Egyptologists, since the 19th century, to post an heiress theory: that succession was through inheritance in a matriarchal line. This theory has been applied to the Eighteenth Dynasty, and thought to explain the justification  Hatshepsut  might have used to declare herself a king. But in the Eighteenth Dynasty, there are a number of instances where a kings mother and/or wife is known or suspected not to be royal. Amenhotep I, predecessor of Hatshepsuts father, Thutmose I, was married to Meryetamun who may or may not have been his sister, and thus royal. Thutmose I was not the son of a royal woman. Thutmose Is wives, Ahmes (mother of Hatshepsut) and Mutneferet, may or may not have been daughters of Ahmose I and sisters of his son, Amenhotep I. Thutmose II and III were not sons of royal women, as far as is known. Both were born of minor, non-royal wives. Amenhotep IIs mother and Thutmose IIIs wife, Meryetre, was almost certainly not royal. Clearly, royalty could be seen in the Eighteenth Dynasty as passing through either father or mother. In fact, Thutmose IIIs desire to emphasize the legitimacy of the descent of his son, Amenhotep II, through the patrilineal line of Thutmose I, II, and III, may have been a major motive for removing images and inscriptions that documented that Hatshepsut had been a king. Why Did Hatshepsut Stay King? If we think we understand why Hatshepsut or her advisors felt it necessary to take on the full kingship, theres one question left: why, when Thutmose III became old enough to rule, didnt he seize power or Hatshepsut step aside voluntarily? The female pharaoh Hatshepsut ruled for more than two decades, first as a regent for her nephew and stepson, Thutmose III, then as full Pharaoh, assuming even a male identity. Why didnt Thutmose III become the pharaoh (king) as soon as he came of age? Why didnt he remove his stepmother, Hatshepsut, from the kingship, and take power for himself, when he was old enough to rule? Its estimated that Thutmose III was very young at the time his father, Thutmose II, died, Hatshepsut, wife and half-sister of Thutmose II, and thereby stepmother and aunt of Thutmose III, became regent for the young king. In early inscriptions and images, Hatshepsut and Thutmose III are shown as co-rulers, with Hatshepsut taking a more senior position. And in year 7 of their joint reign, Hatshepsut took on the full powers and identity of a king, and is shown dressed as a male king from that time. She reigned, it seems from the evidence, for more than 20 years. Surely Thutmose III would have been old enough to take over by the end of that time, whether by force or with Hatshepsuts cooperation? Does the failure of Hatshepsut to step aside speak for her usurpation of power against the will of Thutmose III? For his weakness and powerlessness, as in the no-longer-widely-accepted wicked stepmother story? In ancient Egypt, the kingship was tied up with several religious myths. One was the Osiris / Isis / Horus myth. The king was identified, during life, with Horus—one of the kings formal titles was a Horus name. At the kings death, the king became Osiris, father of Horus, and the new king became the new Horus. What would it do to this identification of the deities Horus and Osiris with the king, if the previous king did not die before the new king took on full kingship? There are some co-ruling kings in Egyptian history. But there is no precedence for a former Horus. There was no way to become un-king. Only death could lead to a new king. Religious Reasons Thutmose III Could Not Take Power It was most likely in Thutmose IIIs power to overthrow and kill Hatshepsut. He was general of her army, and his military prowess after her death attests to his skill and willingness to take risks. But he did not rise up and do so. So if Thutmose III did not hate his stepmother, Hatshepsut, and out of hate want to overthrow and kill her, then it makes sense that for the sake of Maat (order, justice, rightness) that he cooperated with her remaining as king, once shed taken the step of declaring herself king. Hatshepsut had already apparently decided—or the priests or advisors had decided for her—that she must take on the role of king and a male identity, as there was also no precedence for a female Horus or Osiris. To break with the identification of the king with the myth of Osiris and Horus would have also been to question the identification itself, or to seem to open Egypt to chaos, the opposite of Maat. Hatshepsut may have been, essentially, stuck with the identity of the king until her own death, for the sake of Egypts prosperity and stability. And so also was Thutmose III stuck. Sources consulted include: James H. Breasted.  A History of Egypt from the Earliest Times to the Persian Conquest.  1905.Kara Cooney.  Interview, July 3, 2007.Aidan Dodson and Dyan Hilton.  The Complete Royal Families of Ancient Egypt.  2004.W. F. Edgerton.  Thutmosid Succession.  1933.Zahi Hawass.  The Realm of the Pharaoh.  2006.John Ray. Hatshepsut: the Female Pharaoh.  History Today.  Volume 44 number 5, May 1994.Catharine H. Roehrig, editor.  Hatshepsut: From Queen to Pharaoh. 2005. Article contributors include Ann Macy Roth, James P. Allen, Peter F. Dorman, Cathleen A. Keller, Catharine H. Roehrig, Dieter Arnold, Dorothea Arnold.Secrets of Egypts Lost Queen. First aired: 7/15/07. Discovery Channel. Brando Quilico, executive producer.Joyce Tyldesley.  Chronicle of the Queens of Egypt.  2006.Joyce Tyldesley.  Hatchepsut the Female Pharaoh.  1996.